SMB, RPC & NetBIOS Enumeration: enum4linux, smbclient, NetExec

This is Chapter 7 of the Scanning & Enumeration notebook. The previous chapter walked the four classic text-based services a tester meets first — FTP, SSH, SMTP and Telnet — and taught banner grabbing as the universal primitive that turns an open port into a named, versioned service. This chapter takes that discipline into the single most productive target on any corporate network: the Server Message Block (SMB) stack on ports 139 and 445, together with the NetBIOS name service on 137/138 and the MS-RPC interfaces that ride on top of SMB through named pipes.

There is a reason experienced testers go straight for 445 the moment a scan comes back. On a Windows estate, SMB is not just file sharing — it is the transport for authentication, remote administration, printing, and a whole family of Remote Procedure Call (RPC) interfaces that will, if the target is misconfigured, cheerfully hand you the complete list of domain users, groups, password policy, shares, and the domain’s Security Identifier (SID) before you have a single credential. A permissive SMB configuration is frequently the entire difference between “we scanned it” and “we own the domain.” Every serious Active Directory attack path — Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, password spraying, lateral movement with psexec/wmiexec, BloodHound collection — begins with the enumeration you will learn here.

We build the whole thing from the ground up: what NetBIOS is and why a 1980s naming protocol still shapes modern Windows networking; how SMB evolved from the broken, wormable SMB1/CIFS to the signed, encrypted SMB3.1.1; how DCE/RPC exposes interfaces like SAMR, LSARPC and SRVSVC over named pipes; and then, tool by tool — nbtscan, nmblookup, smbclient, rpcclient, enum4linux and enum4linux-ng, NetExec (the actively-maintained successor to CrackMapExec), smbmap, and the Nmap smb-* NSE library — exactly how to extract that intelligence, with every flag explained and realistic output annotated.

Everything here is active enumeration against live services: you are authenticating (often as nobody), listing shares, cycling RIDs and reading RPC interfaces, all of which is logged and, at volume, alertable. It stays entirely inside authorised scope. Enumerating SMB services you have no written permission to test — and especially guessing or spraying credentials against them — is unlawful in most jurisdictions. Scope and a signed rules-of-engagement document are hard boundaries, assumed throughout and flagged where the risk is highest.

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Part 1: Why SMB Is the Center of Gravity on a Windows Network

Before any tooling, internalise why this port matters so much, because it will shape how aggressively you prioritise it in every engagement.

On a typical enterprise, three facts stack on top of each other:

1. SMB is everywhere and always on. Every Windows server and workstation speaks it. Domain Controllers must expose it (the SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares are how Group Policy is distributed to every machine). File servers, print servers, backup appliances, NAS boxes (Samba on Linux), and even many IoT/embedded devices expose 445.

2. SMB carries authentication and remote control, not just files. The same port is the transport for named-pipe RPC calls that let you query the Security Account Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA), the server service, the task scheduler, the service control manager, and the registry — remotely. This is why “SMB enumeration” and “getting a foothold” are so tightly coupled.

3. Defaults and legacy leak information. For historical compatibility, many Windows and almost all misconfigured Samba deployments allow an anonymous / null session — a connection with an empty username and empty password — that can still read RPC interfaces. Even where anonymous is locked down, a single low-privileged domain credential typically unlocks the entire directory to read.

Put together: SMB is a high-value, high-exposure, information-dense service that is present on nearly every host and frequently misconfigured. That is why the methodology in this chapter is worth memorising cold.

mindmap
  root((SMB on 445))
    File Sharing
      Shares (C$, ADMIN$, SYSVOL, NETLOGON)
      Spidering for secrets
    Authentication
      NTLM / Kerberos over SMB
      Null / guest sessions
      Password spraying
    RPC over Named Pipes
      SAMR - users, groups, SID
      LSARPC - policy, SID lookups
      SRVSVC - shares, sessions
    Remote Execution
      psexec / smbexec / wmiexec
      Service + task creation
    Known Exploits
      MS17-010 EternalBlue (SMB1)
      CVE-2020-0796 SMBGhost (SMB3)

Pentester landing on a fresh network: after host discovery and a port sweep, the hosts with 445 open are your first stop, and the ones that also answer a null session are gold. Blue team framing: the same reasoning explains why 445 should never be reachable from an untrusted network and why anonymous access must be disabled — the attacker’s entire opening move is reconnaissance of your directory using your own services.

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Part 2: NetBIOS, SMB and CIFS — Untangling the Terminology

Newcomers get lost here because four overlapping names — NetBIOS, NetBEUI, SMB and CIFS — are used loosely and often interchangeably in tool output and blog posts. Precision matters, because the ports and behaviours differ.

NetBIOS (Network Basic Input/Output System)

NetBIOS is not a protocol; it is an API invented by IBM in 1983 for applications on early PC LANs to talk to each other by name. It provides three services: a name service, a datagram service, and a session service. In its original form it ran over NetBEUI, a non-routable layer-2 protocol. When TCP/IP took over, NetBIOS was bolted on top of it as NetBIOS over TCP/IP (NBT), standardised in RFC 1001/1002, and that mapping gives us the classic port assignments:

Port	Proto	NetBIOS service	What it does
137	UDP	Name Service (NBNS)	Registers and resolves NetBIOS names (like a mini-DNS for the LAN)
138	UDP	Datagram Service	Connectionless messages, browser service announcements
139	TCP	Session Service	Carries SMB inside a NetBIOS session

The critical takeaway: port 139 is SMB wrapped in a NetBIOS session layer. It is the legacy path.

SMB and CIFS

Server Message Block (SMB) is the actual file/print/IPC sharing protocol. It was created by IBM and heavily extended by Microsoft. In the late 1990s Microsoft rebranded its SMB dialect CIFS (Common Internet File System) — so when you see “CIFS”, read “an old SMB1 dialect.” Modern documentation and tools mostly say SMB again.

The pivotal change came with Windows 2000, which let SMB run directly over TCP on port 445, dropping the NetBIOS session layer entirely. So:

• Port 139 = SMB over NetBIOS over TCP/IP (legacy).
• Port 445 = SMB directly over TCP (modern, “direct host”).

Both can be open. Tools and Nmap will often show both. When 445 is available you generally prefer it; 139 remains useful when 445 is filtered or on old boxes.

The SMB dialect timeline

Dialect	Introduced with	Notes for a tester
SMB1 / CIFS	LAN Manager, NT4, Win2000	Wormable. Home of MS17-010/EternalBlue. Should be disabled everywhere.
SMB2.0	Windows Vista / 2008	Complete rewrite, far fewer commands, better performance.
SMB2.1	Windows 7 / 2008 R2	Leasing, large MTU.
SMB3.0	Windows 8 / 2012	Encryption (AES-CCM), secure dialect negotiation.
SMB3.0.2	Windows 8.1 / 2012 R2	Incremental.
SMB3.1.1	Windows 10 / 2016+	Pre-auth integrity (SHA-512), AES-GCM. Home of CVE-2020-0796 (SMBGhost) in the compression path.

Security relevance: the dialect a host will negotiate is itself intelligence. A box that still speaks SMB1 is telling you it may be vulnerable to a whole class of legacy attacks and that its patch hygiene is poor. One of your first checks is always “does this host still allow SMB1?”

flowchart LR
    A[NetBIOS API, 1983] --> B[NBT: NetBIOS over TCP/IP]
    B --> C[Port 137 UDP Name]
    B --> D[Port 138 UDP Datagram]
    B --> E[Port 139 TCP Session]
    E --> F[SMB1 / CIFS]
    G[Windows 2000] --> H[Port 445 TCP: SMB direct]
    H --> I[SMB2 / 2.1]
    I --> J[SMB3.x encryption + signing]

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Part 3: How an SMB Conversation Actually Works

To enumerate intelligently you need a mental model of the exchange, because every tool in this chapter is just automating parts of it.

A client-to-server SMB session has four logical stages:

1. Negotiate — the client sends the list of dialects it supports; the server picks the highest common one. This is where SMB1-vs-SMB3 is decided and where secure negotiation (anti-downgrade) lives in SMB3.
2. Session Setup (authentication) — the client authenticates using NTLM or Kerberos (via the SPNEGO/GSS-API wrapper). A null session is simply a Session Setup with an empty username and password; a guest session maps an unknown user to the Guest account. This step also leaks the target’s NetBIOS/DNS domain and computer name and OS build in the NTLM challenge — useful even when auth fails.
3. Tree Connect — the client connects to a specific share (a “tree”), e.g. \\server\IPC$. The special IPC$ share (“Inter-Process Communication”) carries no files; it is the pipe over which RPC calls travel, and it is the share a null session connects to in order to run enumeration.
4. Operations — file reads/writes, directory listings, or — over IPC$ — named-pipe RPC calls to interfaces like \samr, \lsarpc, \srvsvc.

sequenceDiagram
    participant C as Attacker (client)
    participant S as Target (SMB server)
    C->>S: Negotiate Protocol (offer dialects)
    S-->>C: Selected dialect (e.g. SMB 3.1.1) + capabilities
    C->>S: Session Setup (NTLM/Kerberos, or NULL / guest)
    S-->>C: Session established (leaks domain, host, OS)
    C->>S: Tree Connect \\target\IPC$
    S-->>C: Tree ID granted
    C->>S: NamedPipe open \samr + DCE/RPC bind
    S-->>C: Bind ack
    C->>S: SamrEnumerateUsersInDomain ...
    S-->>C: List of RIDs / usernames

The two ideas to hold onto: IPC$ is the doorway to RPC, and even a failed or anonymous authentication leaks host/domain metadata. Everything else is detail on top of these.

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Part 4: MS-RPC, DCE/RPC and Named Pipes — The Real Intelligence Layer

File shares are useful, but the crown jewels of SMB enumeration come from RPC. Understanding this layer is what separates a tester who runs enum4linux and copies the output from one who knows what it queried and can do it by hand when the wrapper breaks.

DCE/RPC (Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call) is the framework that lets a client call a function that executes on a server as if it were local. Microsoft’s implementation is MS-RPC. On a Windows network, many RPC interfaces are reachable over SMB named pipes — special files under the IPC$ share whose names map to services:

Named pipe	Interface	What you can enumerate
\samr	SAMR (Security Account Manager Remote)	Local & domain users, groups, RIDs, password policy
\lsarpc	LSARPC (Local Security Authority)	Domain SID, SID↔name lookups, trust info, policy
\srvsvc	SRVSVC (Server Service)	Shares, active sessions, connected users, server info
\netlogon	NETLOGON	Secure-channel functions (home of Zerologon, CVE-2020-1472)
\svcctl	SVCCTL (Service Control Manager)	Create/start services → remote code exec (psexec-style)
\atsvc / \ITaskSchedulerService	Task Scheduler	Schedule tasks → code exec
\winreg	Remote Registry	Read/write registry hives remotely
\spoolss	Print System	Home of PrintNightmare and the printer-bug coercion (SpoolSample)
\efsrpc / \lsarpc	EFSRPC / MS-EFSR	Coercion (PetitPotam)

Two of these — SAMR and LSARPC — are the workhorses of pre-credential enumeration:

• SAMR lets you walk the account database. EnumDomainUsers returns usernames and their RIDs. This is how tools dump every domain user without a credential when a null session is allowed.
• LSARPC gives you the domain SID and a lookup primitive that converts a SID+RID into a name and vice-versa. This is the engine behind RID cycling: once you know the domain SID, you can ask “who is SID-500? SID-501? … SID-1105?” one at a time and rebuild the entire user list even when EnumDomainUsers is blocked.

flowchart TD
    A[Connect IPC$ null/creds] --> B{lsarpc reachable?}
    B -->|yes| C[LsarQueryInformationPolicy -> Domain SID]
    C --> D[RID cycle: SID-500..SID-1xxx]
    D --> E[LsarLookupSids -> usernames]
    A --> F{samr reachable?}
    F -->|yes| G[SamrEnumDomainUsers -> user list + RIDs]
    F -->|yes| H[SamrQueryDomainInfo -> password policy]
    E --> Z[Merged account list]
    G --> Z

Red team usage: the merged account list feeds directly into password spraying and AS-REP/Kerberoast target selection. Blue team usage: these same named-pipe binds are exactly what your detections should watch for — an anonymous session performing SamrEnumerateUsersInDomain or a burst of LsarLookupSids calls is enumeration, not normal traffic.

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Part 5: Fingerprinting SMB — First Contact with Nmap and the NSE Library

You always start by confirming what is actually running before you throw authenticated tooling at it. Nmap (taught from scratch in Chapters 2–4) is the fastest way to fingerprint SMB and to run a battery of safe checks via the NSE smb-* scripts.

The core version + script scan

nmap -p 139,445 -sV --script "smb-protocols,smb-security-mode,smb2-security-mode,smb-os-discovery" 10.10.10.5

Flag-by-flag:

• -p 139,445 — restrict to the two SMB ports so the scan is fast and quiet.
• -sV — service/version detection; probes to identify Samba vs Windows SMB and the version banner.
• --script "..." — run this comma-separated list of NSE scripts. Quotes stop the shell from globbing the commas/braces.
  • smb-protocols — enumerates which dialects (SMB1/2/3) the host will speak. This is your SMB1 red-flag check.
  • smb-security-mode / smb2-security-mode — reports message-signing status (disabled / enabled / required). Signing “not required” is what makes NTLM relay possible.
  • smb-os-discovery — pulls OS, computer name, domain, and (on many hosts) the system time and uptime.

Realistic annotated output

Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.5
Host is up (0.032s latency).

PORT    STATE SERVICE     VERSION
139/tcp open  netbios-ssn Samba smbd 4.6.2
445/tcp open  netbios-ssn Samba smbd 4.6.2

Host script results:
| smb-protocols:
|   dialects:
|     NT LM 0.12 (SMBv1) [dangerous, but default]   <-- SMB1 still enabled
|     2.0.2
|     2.1
|     3.0
|_    3.1.1
| smb-security-mode:
|   account_used: guest
|   authentication_level: user
|   challenge_response: supported
|_  message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)  <-- relay possible
| smb2-security-mode:
|   3.1.1:
|_    Message signing enabled but not required           <-- relay possible
| smb-os-discovery:
|   OS: Windows 6.1 (Samba 4.6.2)
|   Computer name: hutch
|   NetBIOS computer name: HUTCH\x00
|   Domain name: hutch.local
|   FQDN: hutch.hutch.local
|_  System time: 2026-10-13T14:22:07+00:00

Read like a tester: SMB1 is enabled (legacy exposure), signing is not required (relay candidate), and you already have the domain (hutch.local) and hostname (hutch) — all before authenticating. The account_used: guest line tells you a guest session succeeded, which strongly hints null/guest enumeration will work.

The safe vuln checks

nmap -p 445 --script "smb-vuln-ms17-010,smb-double-pulsar-backdoor" 10.10.10.5

smb-vuln-ms17-010 safely checks for the EternalBlue vulnerability without exploiting it (it probes the vulnerable transaction path and reports VULNERABLE/NOT VULNERABLE). Never confuse this safe check with running the exploit — the check is fine on scoped targets; launching MS17-010 exploitation can crash the target and must be explicitly authorised.

Script categories to know: --script smb-vuln* runs every SMB vuln script; some are intrusive and can hang or crash fragile hosts. On production, stick to the named safe checks above rather than the whole vuln category.

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Part 6: NetBIOS Name Enumeration — nbtscan and nmblookup

Before SMB itself, the NetBIOS name service on UDP 137 can be queried directly. It is fast, unauthenticated, and often reveals the hostname, domain/workgroup, logged-on user hint, and whether the host is a domain controller — even on hosts where 445 is filtered.

nmblookup — the name-service query tool

nmblookup ships with the Samba client suite (sudo apt install smbclient samba-common-bin on Kali; it’s usually already present). It sends NetBIOS name queries.

nmblookup -A 10.10.10.5

• -A treats the argument as an address and does a “node status” query, asking the host to list its registered NetBIOS names.

Looking up status of 10.10.10.5
        HUTCH           <00> -         B <ACTIVE>   (workstation/redirector)
        HUTCH           <20> -         B <ACTIVE>   (file server service)
        HUTCH.LOCAL     <00> - <GROUP> B <ACTIVE>   (domain/workgroup name)
        HUTCH.LOCAL     <1c> - <GROUP> B <ACTIVE>   (domain controllers)
        HUTCH.LOCAL     <1b> -         B <ACTIVE>   (domain master browser = PDC)
        MAC Address = 00-0C-29-3A-1B-77

The two-hex suffix codes are the payload. Memorise the important ones:

Suffix	Meaning	Why you care
<00>	Workstation service	Host is up and speaking NetBIOS
<20>	File Server service	SMB file sharing is running
<1b>	Domain Master Browser	This host is the PDC / a Domain Controller
<1c>	Domain Controllers group	Domain name; DCs registered here
<1d>	Master Browser	Segment master browser
<1e>	Browser Service Elections	Browser election participant
<03>	Messenger service	Often the logged-on username

Seeing <1b> here immediately tells you this box is a Domain Controller — a top-priority target.

nbtscan — sweeping a whole subnet

nbtscan (sudo apt install nbtscan) does the same node-status query but across an entire range at once, which is perfect right after host discovery.

nbtscan -r 10.10.10.0/24

• -r uses the local UDP port 137 as the source port, which some firewalls require for the reply to return.

Doing NBT name scan for addresses from 10.10.10.0/24

IP address       NetBIOS Name     Server    User             MAC address
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10.10.10.5       HUTCH            <server>  HUTCH            00:0c:29:3a:1b:77
10.10.10.12      WS01             <server>  jdoe             00:0c:29:aa:bb:cc
10.10.10.30      FILESRV01        <server>  FILESRV01        00:0c:29:de:ad:00

The User column (from the <03> messenger record) sometimes reveals the interactively logged-on user — here jdoe on WS01 — which is a free, unauthenticated username for later spraying.

Blue team note: NBNS/LLMNR/mDNS name resolution is also what enables responder-style poisoning. Disabling NetBIOS over TCP/IP and LLMNR both shrinks this enumeration surface and kills a major credential-theft vector.

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Part 7: smbclient — Talking to Shares from Scratch

smbclient is the FTP-like command-line SMB client from the Samba project. It is the most direct way to manually list and browse shares, and understanding it makes every higher-level tool legible.

Install and first use

It’s preinstalled on Kali; otherwise sudo apt install smbclient.

List shares with a null session:

smbclient -L //10.10.10.5/ -N

• -L //host/ — list the shares exported by the host (the trailing slash/host form is the “list mode”).
• -N — no password; suppresses the password prompt. Combined with the default empty username this attempts a null/anonymous session.

        Sharename       Type      Comment
        ---------       ----      -------
        print$          Disk      Printer Drivers
        IPC$            IPC       IPC Service (hutch server)
        Development     Disk
        Users           Disk
        netlogon        Disk      Logon server share
        sysvol          Disk      Logon server share
        SYSVOL          Disk      Logon server share
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.

        Server               Comment
        ---------            -------

        Workgroup            Master
        ---------            -------
        HUTCH.LOCAL          HUTCH

Interpretation: IPC$ is always present (that’s the RPC pipe). Development and Users are non-default Disk shares — those are the ones worth reading. SYSVOL/netlogon confirm this is a Domain Controller.

Explicit anonymous with a username:

smbclient -L //10.10.10.5/ -U '' -N          # empty user
smbclient -L //10.10.10.5/ -U 'guest' -N     # guest account

Connecting to and browsing a share

smbclient //10.10.10.5/Development -N

Once connected you get an FTP-style smb: \> prompt. Core interactive commands:

Command	Action
ls / dir	List current directory
cd <dir>	Change directory on the share
get <file>	Download a file to your CWD
mget *	Download multiple files (prompt off with prompt)
put <file>	Upload (if writable)
recurse ON / prompt OFF	Prepare for a non-interactive recursive pull
mask ""	Clear the filename mask before recursive mget
!<cmd>	Run a local shell command
exit	Disconnect

Recursively download an entire share (great for offline analysis):

smb: \> recurse ON
smb: \> prompt OFF
smb: \> mget *

One-liner to grab a known file with authenticated creds:

smbclient //10.10.10.5/Users -U 'HUTCH/jdoe%Summer2026!' -c 'get jdoe/Desktop/notes.txt'

• -U 'DOMAIN/user%password' — inline credentials; % separates password (avoids a prompt in scripts).
• -c 'command' — run one command non-interactively and exit. Perfect for automation.

CTF/Bug-bounty angle: on HackTheBox and TryHackMe, an anonymously-readable share containing a web.config, a script with a hard-coded service password, a KeePass file, or a set of home directories is one of the most common first footholds in existence. Always read every readable share top to bottom.

Handling SMB1-only and dialect problems

Old boxes sometimes refuse modern dialects. Force protocol behaviour with:

smbclient -L //10.10.10.5/ -N --option='client min protocol=NT1'

client min protocol=NT1 forces SMB1 (NT1). Newer Samba disables SMB1 by default, so this option is what you reach for against genuinely ancient targets that only speak CIFS.

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Part 8: rpcclient — Enumerating the Directory by Hand

rpcclient (also from Samba) connects to the MS-RPC interfaces over IPC$ and lets you invoke individual RPC calls interactively. This is the manual equivalent of what enum4linux automates, and doing it by hand at least once is the difference between understanding the attack and cargo-culting it.

Establish a null session

rpcclient -U '' -N 10.10.10.5

• -U '' — empty username, -N — no password → null session. If it drops you at the rpcclient $> prompt, anonymous RPC is allowed and you have won the opening move.

The high-value commands

Server + domain info:

rpcclient $> srvinfo
        HUTCH          Wk Sv PrQ Unx NT SNT hutch server
        platform_id     :       500
        os version      :       6.1
        server type     :       0x809a03

Enumerate all domain users (SAMR EnumDomainUsers):

rpcclient $> enumdomusers
user:[Administrator] rid:[0x1f4]
user:[Guest]         rid:[0x1f5]
user:[krbtgt]        rid:[0x1f6]
user:[jdoe]          rid:[0x450]
user:[svc_backup]    rid:[0x452]
user:[hhogan]        rid:[0x455]

The rid:[0x1f4] values are hex RIDs — 0x1f4 = 500 (the built-in Administrator), 0x1f5 = 501 (Guest), 0x1f6 = 502 (krbtgt, present only on DCs — another DC confirmation). Custom accounts start around RID 1000 (0x3e8).

Query one user in detail:

rpcclient $> queryuser 0x450
        User Name   :   jdoe
        Full Name   :   John Doe
        ...
        Logon Time  :   Tue, 13 Oct 2026 09:15:22
        Password last set : Mon, 07 Sep 2026 ...
        acb_info    :   0x00000010    (Normal account)

Enumerate groups and their members:

rpcclient $> enumdomgroups
group:[Domain Admins]  rid:[0x200]
group:[Domain Users]   rid:[0x201]
rpcclient $> querygroupmem 0x200
        rid:[0x452] attr:[0x7]         <-- svc_backup is a Domain Admin!

That last result — a service account in Domain Admins — is exactly the kind of high-impact finding SMB enumeration surfaces for free.

Get the domain SID and do a lookup (LSARPC):

rpcclient $> lsaquery
Domain Name: HUTCH
Domain Sid: S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222229433

rpcclient $> lookupnames Administrator
Administrator S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222229433-500 (User: 1)

rpcclient $> lookupsids S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222229433-1104
S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222229433-1104 HUTCH\hhogan (1)

Extract the password policy (feeds spraying safety):

rpcclient $> getdompwinfo
min_password_length: 7
password_properties: 0x00000000

Knowing min_password_length and, via getusrdompwinfo, the lockout threshold is what lets you spray without locking accounts. Never spray blind — read the policy first.

rpcclient command reference

Command	RPC interface	Yields
srvinfo	SRVSVC	OS version, server type
enumdomusers	SAMR	All users + RIDs
queryuser <rid>	SAMR	Per-user detail
enumdomgroups	SAMR	Groups + RIDs
querygroupmem <rid>	SAMR	Group membership
getdompwinfo	SAMR	Password policy
lsaquery	LSARPC	Domain SID
lookupnames <name>	LSARPC	Name → SID
lookupsids <sid>	LSARPC	SID → name (RID cycling)
netshareenum / netshareenumall	SRVSVC	Shares (incl. hidden)
enumdomains	SAMR	Domains on the host

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Part 9: RID Cycling — Rebuilding the User List When EnumDomainUsers Is Blocked

Sometimes enumdomusers returns NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED (a common “RestrictAnonymous” hardening) but the LSARPC lookup primitive is still open. RID cycling exploits that: SIDs are predictable — DomainSID-<RID> — and well-known RIDs (500 Administrator, 501 Guest, 502 krbtgt) plus the 1000+ range for real accounts mean you can brute-force names one SID at a time.

The manual loop with rpcclient:

for rid in $(seq 500 1100); do
  rpcclient -U '' -N 10.10.10.5 \
    -c "lookupsids S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222229433-$rid" \
    2>/dev/null | grep -v '\*unknown\*'
done

• We reuse the domain SID from lsaquery.
• -c "lookupsids ..." runs one lookup per iteration.
• grep -v '\*unknown\*' filters out RIDs that map to nothing.

flowchart LR
    A[Get Domain SID via lsaquery] --> B[Set RID range 500..1200]
    B --> C{lookupsids SID-RID}
    C -->|maps to name| D[Record DOMAIN\user]
    C -->|unknown| E[Skip]
    D --> F[Next RID]
    E --> F
    F --> C

This is tedious by hand, which is exactly why the dedicated tools below automate it (enum4linux -r, lookupsid.py, netexec ... --rid-brute). But knowing the primitive means you can improvise when a wrapper fails.

Impacket alternative (Impacket is covered fully in a later chapter; noted here for completeness): lookupsid.py 'anonymous@10.10.10.5' performs the same cycle in one command and is often the cleanest way to do it.

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Part 10: enum4linux and enum4linux-ng — The Classic All-in-One

enum4linux is a Perl wrapper that orchestrates nmblookup, net, rpcclient and smbclient to run essentially everything in Parts 6–9 automatically. It is old, noisy, and its parsing is fragile — but it remains a fast first pass and is on every exam and CTF box. The modern rewrite, enum4linux-ng (Python, actively maintained, JSON/YAML output), is what you should prefer in real work.

enum4linux (classic)

Preinstalled on Kali. The everything-flag:

enum4linux -a 10.10.10.5

• -a — “all simple enumeration”: does OS info, users, shares, groups, password policy and RID cycling in one shot. Equivalent to -U -S -G -P -r -o -n -i.

Targeted flags when -a is too noisy:

Flag	Enumerates
-U	Userlist (via enumdomusers)
-S	Share list
-G	Group list
-P	Password policy
-r	RID cycling
-o	OS information
-n	nmblookup (NetBIOS names)
-i	Printer information
-u user -p pass	Authenticate instead of null session
-R 500-1100	RID range for cycling

Annotated excerpt of -a output:

 ==========================( Target Information )==========================
Target ........... 10.10.10.5
RID Range ........ 500-550,1000-1050
Username ......... ''
Password ......... ''

 ============================( Enumerating Users )============================
index: 0x1 RID: 0x1f4 acb: 0x210 Account: Administrator
index: 0x2 RID: 0x450 acb: 0x210 Account: jdoe
index: 0x3 RID: 0x452 acb: 0x210 Account: svc_backup

 ======================( Share Enumeration on 10.10.10.5 )======================
        Development     Disk
        IPC$            IPC       IPC Service
[+] Attempting to map shares on 10.10.10.5
//10.10.10.5/Development  Mapping: OK Listing: OK   <-- readable!
//10.10.10.5/IPC$         Mapping: OK Listing: DENIED

 =================( Password Policy Information )=================
[+] Minimum password length: 7
[+] Account lockout threshold: None                 <-- spraying is safe!

Account lockout threshold: None is a green light for password spraying; Mapping: OK Listing: OK on Development tells you exactly which share to read next.

enum4linux-ng (the modern rewrite)

Install: pipx install enum4linux-ng or git clone https://github.com/cddmp/enum4linux-ng && pip install -r requirements.txt.

enum4linux-ng -A 10.10.10.5 -oJ hutch_enum

• -A — do all checks (like classic -a but more reliable, SMB2/3-aware).
• -oJ hutch_enum — write structured JSON output to hutch_enum.json (also -oY for YAML). Machine-readable output is why this is preferred — you can grep, diff, and feed it into a pipeline.

enum4linux-ng also does clean SMB-dialect detection, signing status, and won’t silently choke on SMB1-disabled hosts the way the Perl original does.

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Part 11: NetExec (nxc) — The Modern Swiss-Army Knife

NetExec (nxc) is the actively-maintained fork/successor of CrackMapExec (CME), which is now unmaintained. If you learned CME, the commands are nearly identical — just swap crackmapexec for netexec (or the short alias nxc). NetExec is the single most useful tool for enumerating and later attacking SMB at scale across many hosts, with a database that remembers everything it finds.

Install

# On Kali:
sudo apt install netexec        # or: pipx install netexec
nxc --version

(nxc and netexec are the same binary.)

Core protocol and target syntax

nxc smb 10.10.10.5
nxc smb 10.10.10.0/24
nxc smb targets.txt

The first argument is always the protocol (smb, winrm, ldap, mssql, ssh, …). Bare, with no creds, it fingerprints:

SMB  10.10.10.5  445  HUTCH  [*] Windows Server 2016 (name:HUTCH) (domain:hutch.local) (signing:False) (SMBv1:True)

That single line gives OS, hostname, domain, signing status, and SMB1 status — the four facts you most want, across an entire subnet in seconds. signing:False = relay candidate; SMBv1:True = legacy exposure.

Null-session and anonymous enumeration

nxc smb 10.10.10.5 -u '' -p '' --shares
nxc smb 10.10.10.5 -u '' -p '' --users
nxc smb 10.10.10.5 -u '' -p '' --rid-brute 3000
nxc smb 10.10.10.5 -u 'guest' -p '' --pass-pol

• -u '' -p '' — null session; -u 'guest' -p '' — guest.
• --shares — list shares and show your READ/WRITE access per share (huge time-saver vs smbclient).
• --users — dump domain users via SAMR.
• --rid-brute 3000 — RID-cycle up to RID 3000 (the automated version of Part 9).
• --pass-pol — dump the password policy.

Annotated --shares output:

SMB  10.10.10.5  445  HUTCH  [+] hutch.local\: (Guest)
SMB  10.10.10.5  445  HUTCH  Share           Permissions   Remark
SMB  10.10.10.5  445  HUTCH  -----           -----------   ------
SMB  10.10.10.5  445  HUTCH  ADMIN$                        Remote Admin
SMB  10.10.10.5  445  HUTCH  C$                            Default share
SMB  10.10.10.5  445  HUTCH  Development     READ
SMB  10.10.10.5  445  HUTCH  IPC$            READ          Remote IPC
SMB  10.10.10.5  445  HUTCH  SYSVOL          READ
SMB  10.10.10.5  445  HUTCH  Users           READ,WRITE    <-- writable!

A WRITE on a user-facing share is a lateral-movement/persistence opportunity (drop a malicious .lnk/SCF for hash capture, or a payload). NetExec makes the permission matrix obvious at a glance.

Authenticated enumeration and spraying

# Validate one credential across a subnet (finds where it works + local admin)
nxc smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u jdoe -p 'Summer2026!'
# Password spray one password across many users
nxc smb 10.10.10.5 -u users.txt -p 'Autumn2026!' --continue-on-success
# Pass-the-hash
nxc smb 10.10.10.5 -u Administrator -H 'aad3b435b51404ee...:31d6cfe0d16ae931...'

• A (Pwn3d!) tag in the output means that credential has local admin on that host — your green light for --exec, psexec, dumping SAM, etc. (all of which belong to the exploitation chapters and must be in scope).
• --continue-on-success keeps going after the first hit when spraying.
• -H does pass-the-hash with an NTLM hash instead of a password.

NetExec modules

nxc smb -L                          # list all modules
nxc smb 10.10.10.5 -u u -p p -M spider_plus   # spider all readable shares, index files
nxc smb 10.10.10.5 -u u -p p -M gpp_password  # hunt for cPassword in SYSVOL (MS14-025)

The spider_plus module recursively catalogues every file in every readable share to JSON — the automated, scalable version of smbclient recurse ON; mget *. gpp_password finds the decryptable cPassword in Group Policy Preferences, a classic instant-win on older domains.

Why NetExec over CrackMapExec: CME’s original repo was archived and is no longer patched; NetExec carries the maintenance, adds new modules, fixes SMB2/3 edge cases, and keeps the same muscle memory. Prefer nxc in all new work.

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Part 12: smbmap — Fast Share and Permission Mapping

smbmap is a focused tool that does one thing extremely well: enumerate shares with their permissions, and optionally spider or execute. It overlaps with nxc --shares but is worth knowing because it predates NetExec, appears in many playbooks, and has a clean recursive listing mode.

Install: pipx install smbmap (preinstalled on Kali).

smbmap -H 10.10.10.5 -u '' -p ''
smbmap -H 10.10.10.5 -u guest -p ''
smbmap -H 10.10.10.5 -u jdoe -p 'Summer2026!' -d HUTCH

• -H — host. -u/-p — creds (empty = null). -d — domain.

[+] IP: 10.10.10.5:445  Name: hutch.local
        Disk              Permissions     Comment
        ----              -----------     -------
        ADMIN$            NO ACCESS       Remote Admin
        C$                NO ACCESS       Default share
        Development       READ ONLY
        IPC$              READ ONLY       Remote IPC
        Users             READ, WRITE

Recursive listing of one share:

smbmap -H 10.10.10.5 -u jdoe -p 'Summer2026!' -r Users
smbmap -H 10.10.10.5 -u jdoe -p 'Summer2026!' -R Users --depth 5   # deep recurse
smbmap -H 10.10.10.5 -u jdoe -p 'Summer2026!' --download 'Users/jdoe/notes.txt'

• -r — list one level of a share; -R — fully recursive; --depth caps recursion.
• --download 'share/path' — pull a specific file.

When to reach for which: nxc --shares for breadth across many hosts and the permission matrix; smbmap -R for a fast recursive directory tree of one interesting share; smbclient for interactive browsing and precise get/put.

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Part 13: Hands-On Lab — Full SMB Enumeration of a Domain Controller

This lab chains every tool into the real workflow you’d run on a scoped internal engagement. The target is a lab DC at 10.10.10.5 (hutch.local). Reproduce it on a lab you own or a platform like HackTheBox/TryHackMe — never on infrastructure you are not authorised to test.

Step 1 — Fingerprint

nmap -p 139,445 -sV --script "smb-protocols,smb2-security-mode,smb-os-discovery" 10.10.10.5
nxc smb 10.10.10.5

Result: Windows Server 2016, domain hutch.local, signing:False, SMBv1:True. Notes: signing not required (relay candidate), SMB1 present (legacy), it’s a DC (SYSVOL later confirms).

Step 2 — NetBIOS names

nmblookup -A 10.10.10.5

<1b> present → confirmed Domain Controller. Record the NetBIOS name HUTCH.

Step 3 — Test null session and list shares

smbclient -L //10.10.10.5/ -N
nxc smb 10.10.10.5 -u '' -p '' --shares

Null session works. Readable non-default share: Development. Users is READ,WRITE.

Step 4 — Pull the directory over RPC

rpcclient -U '' -N 10.10.10.5 -c 'lsaquery; enumdomusers; getdompwinfo'

Domain Sid: S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222229433
user:[Administrator] rid:[0x1f4]
user:[jdoe]          rid:[0x450]
user:[svc_backup]    rid:[0x452]
min_password_length: 7

If enumdomusers had been denied, RID-cycle instead:

nxc smb 10.10.10.5 -u '' -p '' --rid-brute 2000 | grep 'SidTypeUser'

Step 5 — Structured all-in-one for the report

enum4linux-ng -A 10.10.10.5 -oJ hutch_enum
jq '.users | keys' hutch_enum.json
jq '.policy.password_policy' hutch_enum.json

Now you have a machine-readable artifact of users, groups, shares, policy and OS — ideal for the findings write-up and for diffing on re-tests.

Step 6 — Read the interesting share

smbclient //10.10.10.5/Development -N -c 'recurse ON; prompt OFF; mget *'
grep -ri 'password\|pwd\|connectionstring\|Passw' ./

Step 7 — Build the user list and (if in scope) spray safely

# users.txt built from steps 4/5; policy said lockout threshold = None
nxc smb 10.10.10.5 -u users.txt -p 'Hutch2026!' --continue-on-success

A (Pwn3d!) or [+] on any user is a validated credential and, if Pwn3d!, local admin. That is the boundary between enumeration (this chapter) and exploitation (later chapters) — and it must be explicitly authorised in the RoE.

Lab result summary

From an unauthenticated starting point you obtained: OS/host/domain, DC confirmation, full user and group lists with a service account in Domain Admins, the password policy (no lockout), the domain SID, a readable share with secrets, and a writable share. That is a textbook demonstration of why SMB enumeration is the highest-yield activity in internal testing.

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Part 14: The Known SMB Exploits You Must Recognise

Enumeration constantly surfaces hosts vulnerable to a handful of famous SMB bugs. You are not exploiting them in this chapter, but you must recognise the fingerprints and understand the protocol facts, because reporting “SMB1 enabled” without the MS17-010 context undersells the risk.

Name	CVE / MSB	Affects	Protocol fact	Detect (safe)
EternalBlue	MS17-010	SMB1	Buffer overflow in srv.sys Trans2/Trans handling; wormed by WannaCry/NotPetya	nmap --script smb-vuln-ms17-010
DoublePulsar	(implant)	SMB1	Kernel backdoor dropped by EternalBlue	nmap --script smb-double-pulsar-backdoor
SMBGhost	CVE-2020-0796	SMB3.1.1	Integer overflow in the SMB compression header (SMB2_COMPRESSION_TRANSFORM)	version + compression-capability check
Zerologon	CVE-2020-1472	Netlogon (over RPC)	Flawed AES-CFB8 IV in the secure channel → set DC machine password to null	nmap --script smb-vuln-zerologon / zerologon testers
PrintNightmare	CVE-2021-1675 / 34527	spoolss	Print Spooler allows driver install → SYSTEM RCE	nxc smb -M spooler / rpcdump for MS-RPRN
PetitPotam	MS-EFSR coercion	efsrpc/lsarpc	Coerce a host to authenticate to you (relay to AD CS)	check for efsrpc pipe / coercion PoC

Two protocol takeaways: (1) SMB1 being enabled is the single biggest legacy red flag — it’s the precondition for EternalBlue and its worms; (2) the coercion bugs (PetitPotam, PrintNightmare, the printer bug) are RPC-over-SMB features being abused to force authentication, which is why the spoolss/efsrpc pipes matter during enumeration.

Reporting discipline: tie every finding to impact. “Port 445 open” is not a finding; “SMB1 enabled and MS17-010 unpatched on a domain-joined host, exploitable for unauthenticated SYSTEM RCE” is.

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Part 15: Detection & Defense Angle

This is the consolidated blue-team section. Everything above generates telemetry; here is how a defender sees it and shuts it down.

What the enumeration looks like in logs

• Anonymous/null logons appear as Event ID 4624 with Logon Type 3 (Network) and an Anonymous Logon account (ANONYMOUS LOGON, SID S-1-5-7). A spike of these from one source is enumeration.
• Named-pipe access to \samr, \lsarpc, \srvsvc shows up with Event ID 5145 (a network share object was checked) referencing the IPC$ share and the pipe name — the clearest single signal of RPC enumeration.
• SAMR/LSA account enumeration can be surfaced with Event ID 4661 (a handle to an object was requested) on SAM/LSA objects when SACL auditing is enabled.
• RID cycling / SID lookups generate bursts of 4624/4634 (logon/logoff) or repeated LSARPC lookups — a distinctive high-count, low-variety pattern.
• Password spraying shows as many 4625 (failed logon) across many accounts from one source in a short window, often with Logon Type 3 and NTLM.
• Share access to sensitive shares logs 5140 (share accessed) / 5145 (detailed file check).

flowchart LR
    A[Attacker null session] --> B[4624 Anonymous Logon Type 3]
    B --> C[5145 IPC$ samr / lsarpc access]
    C --> D[SAMR EnumUsers / LSA lookups]
    D --> E[SIEM correlation rule fires]
    F[Password spray] --> G[Many 4625 across accounts]
    G --> E

Hardening — kill the enumeration surface

Control	Effect
Disable SMB1 (Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName SMB1Protocol)	Removes EternalBlue class; forces SMB2/3
Require SMB signing (GPO: Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always))	Kills NTLM relay over SMB
RestrictAnonymous / RestrictAnonymousSAM = 1 and RestrictRemoteSAM SDDL	Blocks null-session SAMR/LSA enumeration and remote SAM reads
EveryoneIncludesAnonymous = 0	Anonymous no longer inherits Everyone rights
Block 445/139 at the perimeter and segment internally	SMB should never be internet-reachable; limit lateral reach
Disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP + LLMNR + mDNS	Removes 137/138 enumeration and Responder poisoning
Enable SMB Encryption (SMB3) on sensitive shares	Confidentiality + integrity in transit
Least-privilege shares; remove world-readable shares	Stops share-spidering foothold
Enable Guest account = disabled; deny “Guest” logon over network	Kills guest-session enumeration

Detection engineering

• Alert on Anonymous Logon (Type 3) followed by IPC$ named-pipe access to samr/lsarpc within seconds — this correlation is high-fidelity for enumeration.
• Alert on N distinct target accounts with 4625 from one source in T minutes for spraying (tune N/T to your lockout policy).
• Deploy honeytoken/canary shares and accounts — a share named to attract spidering, or a decoy user in a fake “admin” group. Any touch is malicious by definition and produces a clean, low-false-positive alert.
• Baseline which hosts should speak SMB1 (ideally none) and alert on any SMB1 negotiation.

IR use case: when investigating a suspected intrusion, the sequence “Anonymous Logon → IPC$ → SAMR enumeration → password spray → successful 4624 for a service account → 5140 on SYSVOL” is a canonical early-kill-chain footprint; mapping it lets you scope the compromise back to first contact.

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Part 16: Common Pitfalls and Gotchas

• Confusing 139 and 445. If 445 is filtered but 139 open, force the NetBIOS path (smbclient will use it; some tools need --port 139). Don’t declare “no SMB” just because 445 is closed.
• Assuming null session = full read. Modern, hardened hosts allow the session but return ACCESS_DENIED on SAMR. That’s when you pivot to LSARPC RID cycling, guest, or a single low-priv credential.
• enum4linux (classic) silently choking on SMB1-disabled hosts. Its Perl smbclient calls can hang or misreport. Prefer enum4linux-ng or NetExec on modern targets.
• Spraying before reading the lockout policy. --pass-pol / getdompwinfo first, always. Locking out an entire domain is a career-limiting move and a client-relationship disaster.
• Forgetting the domain in credentials. Many auth failures are just a missing domain: use -u 'DOMAIN\user' or NetExec’s -d DOMAIN. Local vs domain accounts matter — --local-auth in NetExec forces local SAM auth.
• CrackMapExec muscle memory. CME is archived; use NetExec (nxc). Old blog commands still map 1:1.
• Not checking signing. signing:False is a finding and an opportunity (relay). Don’t skip it.
• Treating SYSVOL/NETLOGON as boring. They’re world-readable to any domain user and frequently contain scripts, GPP cPassword, and credentials. Always spider them once you have any credential.
• Noise. enum4linux -a and broad nxc sweeps are loud. On red-team/stealth engagements, prefer targeted single queries and pace them.

---

Part 17: Final Revision / Summary

The mental model to keep:

• Ports: 137/138 (UDP, NetBIOS name/datagram), 139 (TCP, SMB over NetBIOS), 445 (TCP, SMB direct). Prefer 445; fall back to 139.
• Layers: NetBIOS (naming) → SMB/CIFS (file/print/IPC) → RPC over IPC$ named pipes (SAMR, LSARPC, SRVSVC, and the exploit-bearing spoolss/efsrpc/netlogon).
• The opening move: fingerprint (Nmap/nxc) → NetBIOS names (nmblookup/nbtscan) → null/guest session → shares (smbclient/smbmap/nxc --shares) → RPC directory dump (rpcclient, enum4linux-ng, nxc --users/--rid-brute/--pass-pol).
• The payoff: from no credential, you can often get the domain, hostname, OS, full user & group lists, a Domain-Admin service account, the domain SID, the password policy, and readable/writable shares — the complete pre-exploitation intelligence package.
• Recognise the exploits: SMB1 → MS17-010/EternalBlue; SMB3.1.1 compression → SMBGhost; netlogon → Zerologon; spoolss/efsrpc → PrintNightmare/PetitPotam coercion.
• Defense: disable SMB1, require signing, restrict anonymous SAM, segment/block 445, kill NetBIOS/LLMNR, honeytokens, and correlate Anonymous-Logon→IPC$→SAMR in the SIEM.
• Discipline: read the password policy before any spray; stay strictly in scope; tie every finding to concrete impact.

The next chapter continues the enumeration track with SNMP, LDAP, NFS and database service enumeration — the non-SMB services that leak just as much when misconfigured.

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Part 18: Cheat Sheet / Quick Reference

# --- Fingerprint ---
nmap -p 139,445 -sV --script "smb-protocols,smb2-security-mode,smb-os-discovery" TARGET
nmap -p445 --script smb-vuln-ms17-010 TARGET          # safe EternalBlue check
nxc smb TARGET                                        # OS/host/domain/signing/SMBv1

# --- NetBIOS names ---
nmblookup -A TARGET                                   # node status (suffix codes)
nbtscan -r 10.10.10.0/24                              # sweep a subnet

# --- Shares ---
smbclient -L //TARGET/ -N                             # list shares, null session
smbclient //TARGET/SHARE -N                           # browse a share
smbclient //TARGET/SHARE -N -c 'recurse ON;prompt OFF;mget *'
smbmap -H TARGET -u '' -p ''                           # shares + permissions
nxc smb TARGET -u '' -p '' --shares                    # shares + R/W matrix

# --- RPC / directory (null session) ---
rpcclient -U '' -N TARGET
  # > srvinfo | enumdomusers | enumdomgroups | querygroupmem 0x200
  # > getdompwinfo | lsaquery | lookupsids <SID>-<RID>
nxc smb TARGET -u '' -p '' --users
nxc smb TARGET -u '' -p '' --rid-brute 3000            # RID cycling
nxc smb TARGET -u guest -p '' --pass-pol               # password policy

# --- All-in-one ---
enum4linux -a TARGET                                   # classic (legacy/CTF)
enum4linux-ng -A TARGET -oJ out                        # modern, JSON output

# --- Authenticated / spray (IN SCOPE ONLY, read policy first) ---
nxc smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u USER -p 'PASS'                # validate + find (Pwn3d!)
nxc smb TARGET -u users.txt -p 'PASS' --continue-on-success
nxc smb TARGET -u USER -H LMHASH:NTHASH                # pass-the-hash
nxc smb TARGET -u USER -p PASS -M spider_plus          # spider readable shares
nxc smb TARGET -u USER -p PASS -M gpp_password         # GPP cPassword hunt

# Force SMB1 against ancient hosts
smbclient -L //TARGET/ -N --option='client min protocol=NT1'

Key RID/suffix quick facts

RID	Account		Suffix	Meaning
500	Administrator		<00>	Workstation
501	Guest		<20>	File server
502	krbtgt (DC only)		<1b>	Domain Master (DC)
512	Domain Admins (group)		<1c>	Domain Controllers
1000+	Regular accounts		<03>	Logged-on user

---

Part 19: Practice Labs & Resources

Train this chapter’s exact skills on real, legal targets:

• HackTheBox — “Hutch” (the DC modelled loosely in this chapter’s lab): null-session RID cycling to users, then LDAP/SMB to a foothold.
• HackTheBox — “Active” and “Forest”: canonical SMB/RPC enumeration → GPP cPassword (Active) and AS-REP roasting (Forest) starting from anonymous enumeration.
• HackTheBox — “Blue” and “Legacy”: SMB1 fingerprinting and MS17-010 recognition (exploitation in a later chapter — here, practise the detection with nmap --script smb-vuln-ms17-010).
• TryHackMe — “Network Services” (SMB room): guided enum4linux/smbclient/nmblookup walkthrough — the perfect first repetition.
• TryHackMe — “Enumerating Active Directory” and “Attacktive Directory”: null-session enumeration, RID brute with NetExec/Impacket, password policy, then spraying.
• TryHackMe — “SMB” / “Attacking Kerberos”: extends this into the AD attack chain the enumeration feeds.
• Local lab: stand up a Windows Server DC + a Samba box in VirtualBox/VMware; toggle SMB1, signing, and RestrictAnonymous and watch how nxc smb and rpcclient output changes. This is the single best way to internalise which control blocks which technique.
• Blue-team practice: enable SMB/named-pipe auditing on a lab DC, run the enumeration above against it, and hunt for the 4624 Anonymous-Logon → 5145 IPC$ \samr correlation in the Windows Security log or your SIEM.

Reference reading: Microsoft [MS-SMB2], [MS-SAMR], [MS-LSAD] and [MS-SRVS] open specifications (the authoritative protocol docs); the NetExec and enum4linux-ng project wikis; and the HackTricks “Pentesting SMB” page for a command-oriented cross-reference.

Every technique here stays inside authorised scope with a signed rules-of-engagement document. Unauthenticated enumeration is still access — treat it with the same care and legal seriousness as any other testing activity.